

Chapter II

CLASSIFICATION OF THE PHENOMENA OF FELLOW-FEELING

WE must first distinguish from true fellow-feeling all such attitudes as merely contribute to our *apprehending, understanding*, and, in general, *reproducing* (emotionally) the experiences of others, including their states of feeling. Such acts have often, and quite mistakenly, been assimilated to fellow-feeling. This has come about chiefly through the theory of projective 'empathy' which attempted to explain both at the same time.

But it should be clear (before we even begin to consider this class of acts), that any kind of rejoicing or pity *presupposes*, in principle, some sort of *knowledge* of the fact, nature and quality of experience in other people, just as the possibility of such knowledge presupposes, as its condition, the existence of other conscious beings. It is not *through* pity in the first place that I learn of someone's being in pain, for the latter must already *be given* in some form, if I am to notice and then *share* it. One may look at the face of a yelling child as a merely physical object, or one may look at it (in the normal way) as an expression of pain, hunger, etc., though without therefore pitying the child; the two things are utterly different. Thus experiences of pity and fellow-feeling are always additional to an experience in the other which is already grasped and understood. The givenness of these experiences (and naturally, their value) is not based, in the first instance, on sympathy or fellow-feeling—still less is the existence of other selves so established (as W. K. Clifford held).¹ Nor does this apply

¹ A. Riehl has followed him in this. *Vide Principles of Critical Philosophy* (tr. by Arthur Fairbanks, 1894). Part II, p. 160. Cf. W. K. Clifford, *Seeing and Thinking*,

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merely to the knowledge given in the proposition: 'X is in pain' (for I can also be informed of this), nor to the factual judgement 'that X is suffering'—the other person's experience may also be completely realized in the peculiar form of 'reproduced' experience *without* any sort of fellow-feeling being entailed thereby. It is perfectly meaningful to say: 'I can quite visualize your feelings, but I have no pity for you.' Such 'visualized' feeling remains within the cognitive sphere, and is not a morally relevant act. The historian of motives, the novelist, the exponent of the dramatic arts, must all possess in high degree the gift of visualizing the feelings of others, but there is not the slightest need for them to share the feelings of their subjects and personages.

The reproduction of feeling or experience must therefore be sharply distinguished from fellow-feeling. It is indeed a case of feeling the other's feeling, not just knowing of it, nor judging that the other has it; but it is not the same as going through the experience itself. In reproduced feeling we sense the *quality* of the other's feeling, without it being transmitted to us, or evoking a similar real emotion in us.¹ The other's feeling is given exactly like a landscape which we 'see' subjectively in memory, or a melody which we 'hear' in similar fashion—a state of affairs quite different from the fact that we remember the landscape or the melody (possibly with an accompanying recollection of the fact 'that it was seen, or heard'). In the present case there is a real seeing or hearing, yet without the object seen or heard being perceived and accepted as really present; the past is simply 're-presented'. Equally little does the reproduction of feeling or experience imply any sort of 'participation' in the other's experience. Throughout our visualizing of the experience we can remain quite indifferent to whatever has evoked it.

We shall not, at present, give any very detailed account of those acts which serve to establish the existence of other people and their experiences.² It only needs to be emphasized that this acceptance and understanding does not come about as the conclusion to an 'argument from analogy', nor by any projective '*empathy*' or 'mimetic impulse' (Lipps).³ That we cannot be aware of an experience without being aware of a self is something which

London, Macmillan, 1879; O. Külpe's criticism of Clifford's and Riehl's assertions, partly pertinent and partly beside the mark, in his book, *Die Realisierung*, Leipzig, 1920; and also the last chapter of this book.

¹ We feel the quality of the other's sorrow without suffering with him, the quality of his joy without ourselves rejoicing with him. On this, cf. Edith Stein: 'Neues zum Problem der Einfühlung'; Dissertation, Freiburg, 1917.

² Cf. Part III.

³ Cf. Theodor Lipps: 'Das Wissen von fremden Ichen', in *Psychologische Untersuchungen*, Bd. I, Heft 4, 1905.

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is directly based upon the intuitable intrinsic connection between individual and experience; there is no need of empathy on the part of the percipient. That is why we can also have it given to us that the other has an individual self distinct from our own, and that we can never fully comprehend this individual self, steeped as it is in its own psychic experience, but only our own view of it as an individual, conditioned as this is by our own individual nature. It is a corollary of this that the other person has—like ourselves—a sphere of absolute personal privacy, which can never be given to us. But that ‘experiences’ occur there is given for us *in* expressive phenomena—again, not by inference, but directly, as a sort of primary ‘perception’. It is *in* the blush that we perceive shame, *in* the laughter joy. To say that ‘our only initial datum is the body’ is completely erroneous. This is true only for the doctor or the scientist, i.e. for man in so far as he abstracts *artificially* from the expressive phenomena, which have an altogether primary givenness. It is rather that the same basic sense-data which go to make up the body for outward perception, can also construe, for the act of insight, the expressive phenomena which then appear, so to speak, as the ‘outcome’ of experiences within. For the relation here referred to is a *symbolic*, not a causal one.¹ We can thus have insight into others, in so far as we treat their bodies as a *field of expression* for their experiences. In the sight of clasped hands, for example, the ‘please’ is given exactly as the physical object is—for the latter is assuredly *given* as an object (including the fact that it has a back and an inside), in the visual phenomenon. However, the qualities (i.e. the character) of expressive phenomena and those of experiences exhibit connections of a unique kind, which do not depend at all on previous acquaintance with real experiences of our own, plus the other’s expressive phenomena, such that a tendency to *imitate* the movements of the gesture seen would first have to reproduce our own earlier experiences. On the contrary, imitation, even as a mere ‘tendency’, already presupposes some kind of acquaintance with the other’s experience, and therefore cannot explain what it is here supposed to do. For instance, if we (involuntarily) imitate a gesture of fear or joy, the imitation is never called forth simply by the visual image of the gesture; the impulse to imitate only arises when we have already apprehended the gesture *as* an expression of fear or joy. If this apprehension itself were only made possible (as Theodor Lipps believes), by a tendency to imitate and by the *reproduction*, thus evoked, of a previously experienced joy or fear (*plus* an

¹ We might also say that it is not the mere relation of a ‘sign’ to the presence of ‘something’, whereby the latter is subsequently inferred; it refers to a genuine, irreducible property of the sign itself.

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empathic projection of what is reproduced into the other person), we should obviously be moving in a circle. And this applies also to the 'involuntary' imitation of gestures. It already presupposes an imitation of the inner intention of action, which could be realized by quite different bodily movements.¹ We do not imitate the same or similar bodily movements in observed connections of the inorganic, e.g. in inanimate nature, where they cannot be phenomena expressive of psychic experience. Further evidence against Lipps' theory of imitation lies in the fact that we can understand the experience of animals, though even in 'tendency' we cannot imitate their manner of expression; for instance when a dog expresses its joy by barking and wagging its tail, or a bird by twittering. The relationships between expression and experience have a *fundamental* basis of connection, which is independent of our specifically human gestures of expression. We have here, as it were, a *universal grammar*, valid for all languages of expression, and the ultimate basis of understanding for all forms of mime and pantomime among living creatures. Only so are we able to perceive the *inadequacy* of a person's gesture to his experience, and even the contradiction between what the gesture expresses and what it is meant to express. But apart from all this, the imitation of another person's expressive gestures certainly cannot explain the act of *understanding* his inner life. The only way of explaining imitation, and the reproduction of a personal experience similar to that underlying a perceived expressive gesture, is that through this a genuine experience takes place in me, objectively *similar* to that which occurs in the other person whose expression I imitate. For such objective similarity of experience, however, there need be no present consciousness of the similarity, still less an intentionally directed act of 'understanding' or a reproduction of feeling or experience. For my having an experience *similar* to someone else's has nothing whatever to do with understanding him. Besides, such a reproduction in one's experience would require the 'understanding' of another's experience to be preceded in the participant, by a similar *real* experience (however brief); i.e. in the case of feelings, a reproduction of feeling, which would always be itself an actual feeling. But one who 'understands' the mortal terror of a drowning man has no need at all to *undergo* such terror, in a real, if weakened form. This theory therefore contradicts the observable fact that in the process of understanding the thing understood is in no way experienced as real.

It also seems clear that what this theory could explain for us is the very opposite of genuine 'understanding'. This opposite

¹ On the distinction between imitation of action and imitation of movement, cf. K. Koffka: *The Growth of the Mind* (tr. by R. M. Ogden), Kegan Paul, 1924.

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is that *infection* by others' emotions, which occurs in its most elementary form in the behaviour of herds and crowds. Here there is actually a common making of expressive gestures in the first instance, which has the secondary effect of producing similar emotions, efforts and purposes among the people or animals concerned; thus, for instance, a herd takes fright on seeing signs of alarm in its leader, and so too in human affairs. But it is characteristic of the situation that there is a complete lack of mutual 'understanding'. Indeed, the purer the case, inasmuch as a rudimentary act of understanding plays little or no part in it, the more clearly do its peculiar features emerge, namely that the participant takes the experience arising in him owing to his participation to be his *own* original experience, so that he is quite unconscious of the contagion to which he succumbs. This resembles those post-hypnotically suggested acts of will which are carried out without awareness of suggestion (unlike the obeying of commands, where one remains consciously aware that the other's will is not one's own); such acts, indeed, are characteristically regarded by the agent as being his *own*, and so too the experiences arising through participation in a common gesture of expression are ascribed, not to others, but to *oneself*. For this reason, even in daily life, we distinguish between merely aping someone ('taking him off', for instance) and really understanding him, and point the contrast between them.

Thus neither 'projective empathy' nor 'imitation' is necessary in order to explain the primary components of fellow-feeling, viz. understanding, and the vicarious reproduction of feeling or experience. Indeed so far as the first-mentioned acts come into it, it is not understanding they produce, but the possibility of *delusive* understanding.

Let us now turn to *fellow-feeling*, which is primarily based upon those constituents of 'vicarious' understanding already dealt with. Here there are *four* quite different relationships to be distinguished. I call them:

- (1) Immediate community of feeling, e.g. of one and the same sorrow, 'with someone'.
- (2) Fellow-feeling 'about something'; rejoicing in his joy and commiseration with his sorrow.
- (3) Mere emotional infection.
- (4) True emotional identification.

(1) COMMUNITY OF FEELING

Two parents stand beside the dead body of a beloved child. They feel in common the 'same' sorrow, the 'same' anguish. It is

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not that A feels this sorrow and B feels it also, and moreover that they both know they are feeling it. No, it is a *feeling-in-common*. A's sorrow is in no way an 'external' matter for B here, as it is, e.g. for their friend C, who joins them, and commiserates 'with them' or 'upon their sorrow'. On the contrary, they feel it together, in the sense that they feel and experience in common, not only the self-same value-situation, but also the same keenness of emotion in regard to it. The sorrow, as value-content, and the grief, as characterizing the functional relation thereto, are here *one and identical*. It will be evident that we can only feel mental suffering in this fashion, not physical pain or sensory feelings. There is no such thing as a 'common pain'. Sensory types of feeling ('feeling-sensations' as Stumpf calls them), are by nature not susceptible of this highest form of fellow-feeling. They are inevitably 'external' to us in some respect, inspiring only commiseration 'with' and 'upon' the suffering of pain by the other person. By the same token, there is certainly such a thing as rejoicing *at* another's sensory pleasure, but never mutual enjoyment of it (as a common feeling-sensation). It may, however, be the case that A first feels sorrow by himself and is then joined by B in a common feeling. But this, as will be seen, presupposes the higher emotion of love.

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The second case is quite different. Here also, the one person's sorrow is not simply the motivating cause of the other's. *All* fellow-feeling involves *intentional reference* of the feeling of joy or sorrow to the other person's experience. It points this way simply *qua* feeling—there is no need of any prior judgement or intimation 'that the other person is in trouble'; nor does it arise only upon sight of the other's grief, for it can also 'envisage' such grief, and does so, indeed, in its very capacity *as* a feeling.¹ But here A's suffering is first presented *as* A's in an act of understanding or 'vicarious' feeling experienced as such, and it is to this material that B's primary commiseration is directed. That is, *my* commiseration and *his* suffering are phenomenologically *two different facts*, not *one* fact, as in the first case. While in the first case the functions of vicarious experience and feeling are so interwoven with the very fellow-feeling itself as to be indistinguishable from it, in the second case the two functions are plainly distinguished even *while*

¹ In *Zur psychologischen Analyse der ästhetischen Anschauung* Witasek defends the view that what we have called 'understanding' and 'vicarious feeling' is only an 'intuitive presentation of the experience in question'. This contention is decisively refuted by Edith Stein, *op. cit.*, § 4: 'Der Streit zwischen Vorstellungs- und Qualitätsansicht', p. 19.

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experiencing them. Fellow-feeling proper, actual 'participation', presents itself in the very phenomenon as a *re-action* to the state and value of the other's feelings—as these are 'visualized' in vicarious feeling. Thus in this case the two functions of *vicariously visualized* feeling, and *participation* in feeling are separately given and must be sharply distinguished. Very many descriptions of fellow-feeling suffer from failure to make this distinction.¹

Nothing shows the fundamental diversity of the two functions more plainly, than the fact that the first of them can not only be given without the second, but is also present as a basis for the very *opposite* of an (associated) act of fellow-feeling. This happens, for instance, where there is specific pleasure in cruelty, and to a lesser extent in brutality. The *cruel* man owes his awareness of the pain or sorrow he causes entirely to a capacity for visualizing feeling! His joy lies in 'torturing' and in the agony of his victim. As he feels, vicariously, the increasing pain or suffering of his victim, so his own primary pleasure and enjoyment at the other's pain also increases. Cruelty consists not at all in the cruel man's being simply 'insensitive' to other peoples' suffering. Such 'insensitivity' is therefore a quite different defect in man to lack of fellow-feeling. It is chiefly found in pathological cases² (e.g. in melancholia), where it arises as a result of the patient's exclusive preoccupation in his own feelings, which altogether prevents him from giving emotional acceptance to the experience of other people. In contrast to cruelty, '*brutality*' is merely a disregard of other peoples' experience, despite the apprehension of it in feeling. Thus, to regard a human being as a mere log of wood and to treat the object accordingly, is not to be 'brutal' towards him. On the other hand, it is characteristic of brutality, that, given merely a sense of life, undifferentiated, as yet, into separate experiences, given even the fact of an enhanced appearance of life or a tendency towards it, any violent interruption of this tendency (as in vandalism towards plants and trees, to which one cannot be 'cruel'), is enough to mark it as brutal.

(3) EMOTIONAL INFECTION

Quite different again from these, is the case where there is no true appearance of fellow-feeling at all, although it is very

¹ In particular the theory of projective empathy, developed by Theodor Lipps.

² From the psychopathological side, Kurt Schneider's valuable work, *Pathopsychologische Beiträge zur psychologischen Phänomenologie von Liebe und Hass* is in part a verification, in other respects an elaboration and extension, of the phenomenology of sympathetic experience set out in the text (Cologne, Dissertation, 1921). Also in *Zeitschrift für die ges. Neurol. u. Psychiatrie*, Bd. 65, 1921.

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frequently confused with this. Such confusion has given rise to the mistaken theories of positivism concerning the evolution of fellow-feeling (Herbert Spencer) and, moreover, to a quite false appreciation of values, particularly in connection with pity. I have in mind the case of mere *emotional infection*. We all know how the cheerful atmosphere in a 'pub' or at a party may 'infect' the newcomers, who may even have been depressed beforehand, so that they are 'swept up' into the prevailing gaiety. Of course such people are equally remote from a rejoicing of either the first or the second type. It is the same when laughter proves 'catching', as can happen especially with children, and to a still greater extent among girls, who have less sensitivity, but react more readily. The same thing occurs when a group is infected by the mournful tone of one of its members, as so often happens among old women, where one recounts her woes, while the others grow more and more tearful. Naturally, this has nothing whatever to do with pity. Here there is neither a *directing* of feeling towards the other's joy or suffering, nor any participation in her experience. On the contrary, it is characteristic of emotional infection that it occurs only as a transference of the *state* of feeling, and does *not* presuppose any sort of *knowledge* of the joy which others feel. Thus one may only notice afterwards that a mournful feeling, encountered in oneself, is traceable to infection from a group one has visited some hours before. There is nothing in the mournful feeling itself to point to this origin; only by inference from causal considerations does it become clear where it came from. For such contagion it is by no means necessary that any *emotional* experiences should have occurred in the other person. Even the *objective* aspects of such feelings, which attach to natural objects, or are discerned in an 'atmosphere'—such as the serenity of a spring landscape, the melancholy of a rainy day, the wretchedness of a room—can work infectiously in this way on the state of our emotions.¹

The process of infection is an involuntary one. Especially characteristic is its tendency to return to its point of departure, so that the feelings concerned *gather* momentum like an avalanche. The emotion caused by infection reproduces itself *again* by means of expression and imitation, so that the infectious emotion increases, again reproduces itself, and so on. In all mass-excitement, even in the formation of 'public opinion', it is above all this *reciprocal effect* of a self-generating infection which leads to the uprush of a

¹ This shows that the process of infection does *not* lie in the imitation of others' expressed experiences, even though these may actually bring it about, where it is a case of infection through experiences undergone by animals or other human beings.

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common surge of emotion, and to the characteristic feature of a crowd in action, that it is so easily carried beyond the intentions of every one of its members, and does things for which no one acknowledges either the will or the responsibility. It is, in fact, the infective process itself, which generates purposes beyond the designs of any single individual.¹ Although these processes of infection are not merely involuntary but operate 'unconsciously' (however conspicuous they may be), in the sense that we 'get into'

¹ I refrain here from describing the immense part which infection plays in the historical evolution of whole systems of morality, in the genesis of psychopathic group-movements (from *folie à deux* to the emergence of enduring pathological customs and usages on a national scale), in the onset of panics, and particularly within all revolutionary mass-movements. Cf. Gustave Le Bon, *The Crowd: a Study of the Popular Mind*, Unwin, 1896, and *L'Âme Révolutionnaire*; see also Tarde: *Les lois de l'imitation*; and Sigmund Freud: *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego*, who there observes:

'Psycho-analytic research, which has already occasionally attacked the more difficult problems of the psychoses, has also been able to show identification as present in some other cases which are not immediately comprehensible. I shall treat two of these cases in detail as material for our further consideration.

'The genesis of male homosexuality in a large class of cases is as follows. A young man has been unusually long and intensely fixated upon his mother in the sense of the Oedipus complex. But at last, after the end of his puberty, the time comes for exchanging his mother for some other sexual object. Things take a sudden turn: the young man does not abandon his mother: he transforms himself into her, and now looks about for objects which can replace his ego for him, and on which he can bestow such love and care as he has experienced from his mother. This is a frequent process, which can be confirmed as often as one likes, and which is naturally quite independent of any hypothesis which may be made as to the organic driving force and motives of the sudden transformation. A striking thing about this identification is its ample scale; it remoulds the ego in one of its important features—in its sexual character—upon the model of what has hitherto been the object. In this process the object itself is renounced—whether entirely or in the sense of being preserved only in the unconscious is a question outside the present discussion. Identification with an object that is renounced or lost as a substitute for it, introjection of this object into the ego, is indeed no novelty to us. A process of the kind may sometimes be directly observed in small children. A short time ago an observation of this sort was published in the *Internationale Zeitschrift für Psychoanalyse*. A child who was unhappy over the loss of a kitten declared straight out that now he himself was the kitten, and accordingly crawled about on all fours, would not eat at table, etc. (Marcuszewicz: 'Beitrag zum autistischen Denken bei Kindern', *Internationale Zeitschrift für Psychoanalyse*, 1920, Bd. VI).

'Another such instance of introjection of the object has been provided by the analysis of melancholia, an affection which counts among the most noteworthy of its exciting causes the real or emotional loss of a loved object. A leading characteristic of these cases is a cruel self-depreciation of the ego combined with relentless self-criticism and bitter self-reproaches. Analyses have shown that this disparagement and these reproaches apply at bottom to the object and represent the ego's revenge upon it. The shadow of the object has fallen upon the ego, as I have said elsewhere. The introjection of the object is here unmistakably clear', p. 66 (tr. by James Strachey, International Psycho-analytical Library, No. 6, 1922).

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these states without realizing that this is how it comes about, the process itself can again become an instrument of conscious volition. This occurs, for instance, in the search for 'distraction', when we go into gay company, or attend a party, not because we are in festive mood, but simply in order to find distraction; here we anticipate that we shall be infected and 'caught up' in the prevailing gaiety. When someone says that he wants 'to see cheerful faces around him', it is perfectly clear that he does not mean to rejoice with them, but is simply hoping for infection as a means to his *own* pleasure. Conversely, an awareness of possible infection can also create a peculiar *dread* of it, as is found wherever a person shuns melancholy places or avoids the *appearance* of suffering (not the suffering itself), by trying to banish this image from the field of his experience.

That this form of emotional infection also has nothing whatever to do with genuine fellow-feeling should be too obvious for any need of emphasis. And yet the aberrations of some most weighty authors make this emphasis necessary. Thus virtually the whole extent of Herbert Spencer's treatment of the emergence of fellow-feeling (and Darwin's also, to some extent), is no more than a persistent *confusion* of fellow-feeling with emotional infection. This confusion is dominant, especially, in the ever-recurring error of these writers, whereby they seek to derive fellow-feeling from the herd-consciousness and herd-behaviour of the higher animals. An entire trend of thought having thus gone astray, it is no wonder that, in presupposing this false conception of fellow-feeling, Friedrich Nietzsche, for his part, should have arrived at a completely *misguided evaluation* of fellow-feeling, and especially of pity. I select one passage—among many—from his outbursts against pity: 'Through pity, suffering itself becomes infectious; in certain circumstances it may lead to a total loss of life and vital energy which is absurdly out of proportion to the magnitude of the cause (—the case of the death of the Nazarene). This depressing and infectious instinct thwarts those instincts which aim at the preservation and enhancement of the value of life; by *multiplying* misery quite as much as by preserving all that is miserable, it is the principal agent in promoting decadence' (*Anti-Christ*, pp. 131 and 134).¹ It is obvious that here, as in all similar passages, pity is confused with emotional infection. Suffering itself does *not* become infectious through pity. Indeed, it is just where suffering is infectious that pity is completely excluded; for to that extent I no longer view it as the *other's* suffering, but as my *own*, which I try to get rid of, by putting the notion of suffering out of mind. Indeed it is just where infection *does* occur via suffering, that pity for the

¹ [Translated by A. M. Ludovici, London, T. N. Foulis, 1911.]

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other person's sufferings, as being *his*, can stay the infection itself; just as the emotional re-living of an earlier painful experience, which still weighs heavy upon the present, can take this weight off one's mind.¹ Pity would be a 'multiplier of misery' only if it were identical with emotional infection. For only the latter—as we have seen—can produce in others a real suffering, a state of feeling akin to the infectious one. But such real suffering does not occur, however, in *true* fellow-feeling.

(4) EMOTIONAL IDENTIFICATION

The true *sense of emotional unity*, the act of identifying one's own self with that of another, is only a heightened form, a limiting case as it were, of infection. It represents a limit in that here it is not only the separate process of feeling in another that is unconsciously taken as one's own, but his self (in all its basic attitudes), that is identified with one's own self. Here too, the identification is as involuntary as it is unconscious. Lipps has wrongly sought to construe this as a case of æsthetic empathy. Thus, according to him, the absorbed spectator of an acrobat in a circus turn identifies himself with the performer, whose movements he reproduces within himself, in the character of an acrobat. Lipps believes that only the spectator's real self remains distinct here, his conscious self having sunk itself completely in that of the acrobat. Edith Stein has interposed a just criticism on this point.² 'I am not', she says, "'one with" the acrobat; I am only "with" him. The correlated motor-impulses and tendencies are carried out here by a fictional "I", which remains recognizably distinct as a phenomenon from my individual self; it is simply that my attention is passively fixed throughout on the fictional "I", and by way of this, on the acrobat.'

There are other cases, however, insufficiently recognized either by Theodor Lipps or Edith Stein, in which such identification is undoubtedly complete; which do not merely exemplify a moment of true 'ecstasy', but may be of long duration, and can even become habitual throughout whole phases of life. They are of two opposite kinds: the *idiopathic* and the *heteropathic*. Thus identification can come about in *one* way through the total eclipse and absorption of another self by one's own, it being thus, as it were, completely dispossessed and deprived of all rights in its conscious existence and character. It can also come about the other way,

¹ It is not the mere reconstitution of repressed memories, nor yet the abreaction from them, but this *re-living* of them, that underlies whatever therapeutic efficacy psycho-analysis may possess.

² Op. cit.,

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where 'I' (the formal subject) am so overwhelmed and hypnotically bound and fettered by the other 'I' (the concrete individual), that my formal status as a subject is usurped by the other's personality, with all *its* characteristic aspects; in such a case, I live, not in 'myself', but entirely in 'him', the other person—(in and through him, as it were).

Such paradigm-cases of identification, either by way of an all-inclusive propensity to infect, or as a state of complete and total infection of the very roots of individuality, I find exemplified in very different kinds of experience—of which only a few main types can be indicated here:

(a) One such case is to be found in the very peculiar and as yet little understood processes of identification in *primitive* thought, observation and feeling among savages, such as Lévy-Brühl has recently described in detail.¹ They include, for instance, the identification of each member of a totem with an individual member of the totem species. According to von den Steinen, the Boroso allege that they are really identical with red parrots (araras), each member of the totem with a particular red parrot. It is not just that the destiny (birth, sickness, death) of a member of the totem is mysteriously linked with that of his totem animal in a merely causal sense; this connection is really no more than a consequence of their actual *identity*. Such identification occurs even with (objectively) inanimate objects, for instance with particular stones (Foy calls them man-stones). The literal identification of a man with his ancestors is another case in point: he is not merely like his ancestor, or guided and ruled by him, but actually *is*, in his present life, at the same time one of his ancestors. This stage of historical identification between man and ancestor is prior to anything implied by the term 'ancestor-cult'. This cult, and its emotional bond with the ancestor in the form of piety, ritual obligation, etc., already represents a first stage of *liberation* from the primitive identification of the descendant with his ancestor, and presupposes a recognition that the two are *distinct* individuals. It seems to me that it is this type of primitive identification which survives, as it were, into historic times, in the phenomenon of mass self-identification with the 'Leader' (engendering through him a sense of identity among the members themselves); and that it is also the source of the world-wide belief in reincarnation, which is simply a rationalization of these original habits of identification.²

¹ Cf. Lévy-Brühl: *How Natives Think*, particularly p. 70 (tr. by Lilian A. Clare), Allen & Unwin, 1926. Cf. also D. Westermann: 'Tod und Leben bei den Kpelle in Liberia', in *Psychologische Forschung*, I. Band, 1-2 Heft, Berlin, 1921.

² Cf. the admirable examples given by Leo Frobenius in his *Paideuma: Umriss einer Kultur- und Seelenlehre*, 3rd ed. Frankfurt-am-Main, 1928, pp. 42-7, of the forms in which this identification is expressed among the Ethiopians,

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(b) True identification of the heteropathic type occurs in the religious *mysteries of antiquity*,¹ in the course of which the adept, by inducing a state of ecstasy, becomes aware of his true identity in the being, life and destiny of the god or goddess—becomes, in short, divine. Such identification does not merely relate to particular moments in the existence, character and life of the god (who is represented by an animal, e.g. the bull in the Orphic-Dionysian mysteries, or by a man); it extends to a specific cycle of his destined career, of which the phases are reproduced in the ecstasy. It is only through the gradual decay of these mystery-rites that many peoples have developed the arts of the theatre and the drama.² Here at last, the ecstatic *identification* is reduced to the level of mere symbolic *empathy*.

(c) Genuine identification is also present where the relationship between a hypnotist and his subject is not just a temporary one, in which particular acts and undertakings are suggested, but becomes a stable and permanent state, such that the hypnotic subject is continuously 'wrapped up' in all the individual personal attitudes of the hypnotist, thinks only his thoughts, wills only with his will, esteems his values, loves with his love and hates with his hate—but at the same time is convinced that this other self with all its attitudes and forms of action is really his own. But whereas in primitive identification we have a genuine identity of *existence*, in intensified suggestion through continuous hypnosis, involving not merely specific acts and performances, but an adoption of the whole concrete outlook of the hypnotist, we have only an identity of *character*, coupled with an awareness of separation in actual existence. The hypnotic trance³ creates a mental attitude which is primitive only in an artificial sense, and thereby provides a new forcing-ground for suggestion (which does not have to be voluntary). According to Paul Schilder, it is the evolutionarily 'ancient' portions of the brain (the centres of sympathetic and parasympathetic innervation in the region of the third ventricle of the brain) which are functionally modified by hypnosis. Almost all the psychological features characteristic of the child and the primitive are to a large extent artificially regenerated by hypnosis. Such are: the faulty differentiation of perception and imagery; the ecstatic habit of surrendering in passively riveted attention to whatever is

¹ Cf. Odo Casel, O.S.B.: *Die Liturgie als Mysterienfeier*, Freiburg, 1922, a book which brings together a large number of examples of such identification from the mysteries of antiquity. Cf. further Erwin Rohde's classic work, *Psyche* (tr. by W. P. Hillis), Kegan Paul, 1925.

² Cf. similar material in Frobenius, *op. cit.*

³ Cf. the details of recent research on this subject assembled by Paul Schilder in his notable work, *Das Wesen der Hypnose* (Halle, 1912), which also deals with the anatomical and physiological aspects.

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presented; the increasingly affective and instinctive properties of the content experienced (Schilder actually believes that all the effects of hypnosis can also be evoked by emotion); the liability to faulty discrimination between 'I' and 'Thou', and the concurrent tendency to identify with the other self. Where sensory perception is subject to the will of the hypnotist (for it is not only possible, as Lipps held, to induce 'belief' in the presence of a chair or other object, there can really be perception as well), this takes place through control of those instinctive adjustments which ultimately condition all perception (even under normal circumstances). Psychologically, however, we must regard it as a more general characteristic of the hypnotic state, that in it the intellectual centre of all cognitive activity is put out of action, whereas the organic reflex system is stirred into increased activity, and this in respect of its most ancient functions and modes of operation; the 'seat' of the hypnotic subject's own intellectual activity is so *usurped* by that of the hypnotist that his organic and motor centres also come under the latter's intellectual authority, employment and control. The judgement, will and choice of the subject, his love and his hate, are then no longer his own but those of the hypnotist, whose intellect is mounted, so to speak, on the back of the subject's reflex-system. There can be no doubt, however, that the degree to which the subject effaces his own *character* in that of the hypnotist is largely dependent on his personal make-up, and that the phenomena of identification and emotional coalescence here referred to are intimately connected with all the rest.

The desire for positive *self-abasement* shown by the weak towards the strong, with its instinctive (unconscious) aim of participation in the latter's power, is a primitive impulse prior, in our opinion, to the aim of self-preservation and self-protection against a (feared) power: it is merely utilized, pressed into service as it were, by the will to self-preservation and defence. One indication of this is that the 'submissive instinct' may become quite pointless, and can even lead to ends antagonistic to those of self-preservation. Schopenhauer recounts the following observation made by an English officer in the Indian jungle: A white squirrel, having met the gaze of a snake, hanging on a tree and showing every sign of a mighty appetite for its prey, is so terrified by this that it gradually moves towards instead of away from the snake, and finally throws itself into the open jaws. It is of no consequence whether this be a case of conscious suggestion alone (quite involuntary, of course, on the snake's part), or whether it may not also involve a hypnotic narcosis of the squirrel's otherwise active higher centres;—plainly the squirrel's instinct for self-preservation has succumbed to an ecstatic participation in the object of the snake's own appetitive

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nisus, namely 'swallowing'. The squirrel identifies in feeling with the snake, and thereupon spontaneously establishes corporeal 'identity' with it, by disappearing down its throat.

Masochism, whether of the gross or refined type, resembles its opposite, *sadism*, in being simply a (twofold) manifestation of the erotic craving for power. (The two conditions often alternate periodically in the same individual, according to the balance of power between the partners.) Even for the masochist, the object of enjoyment is not pure passivity as such, but his self-identifying participation in the dominance of the partner, i.e. a *sympathetic attainment of power*. Both masochism and sadism are found far more frequently in children than in adults—e.g. in their alternation between cruelty to animals, or even things, and passionate identification with them, between stubborn self-will and limitless surrender; in the case of adults they probably represent simply a fixation at a primitive stage of development (infantilism). Both states easily become sources of idiopathic and heteropathic identification. Schilder concludes with regard to them: 'This apparently illogical combination of contrary characteristics in one personality points to a general psychological law of wide application which may be briefly formulated thus: the lover identifies himself with the beloved, i.e. he adopts the latter's experiences, feels them as his own, and gives expression to this identification in his actions and other traits.'¹ However little we can acknowledge such a 'law' for love in general, we must recognize a tendency of this kind in erotic attachments (which are probably all that Schilder has in mind here).

But Schilder also attempts (like Freud) to establish a genetic connection between hypnosis and the erotic sexual relationship, in order to make both these phenomena of identification more intelligible. He argues for this as follows: (1) The procedures which favour the onset of hypnosis—gentle stroking, continuous admonition of the subject, the 'fascinating' stare, harsh words even—all have erotic value. The 'melting look' on entering the trance and on awakening from it has the same appearance as the expression of erotic satisfaction. There is a feeling of well-being like that associated with sex, and this is referred to the hypnotist; hence the common phantasy that he has sexually misused the subject during the trance (cf. the examples given by Forel in his book on hypnosis). (2) The region of the third ventricle of the brain, which is functionally modified during hypnosis, is also a focal point of the sexual system. Damage to this area leads to disturbances of the sexual functions, such as impotence, irregular menstruation, or modification of the secondary sexual characteristics. (3) There

¹ Op. cit., p. 25 seq.

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is the evidence of animal hypnosis, as found, for example, in the arachnid *Galeodes Caspicus turkestanus*; the male makes an incision with his claws at a particular point on the abdomen of the female and so paralyses her, that she offers no resistance to the sexual act.¹ This suggests that in man also, hypnosis was originally an auxiliary biological function of sexuality, that is, a preliminary disposal of the female so as to facilitate sexual intercourse.

(4) Since inverted sexuality is latent in every individual, hypnosis of man by man or woman by woman is no argument against this.

If this promising hypothesis of Schilder's can withstand further criticism, and if his strongest argument, from the evolutionary evidence, can be corroborated by a larger number of examples, we should be in sight of that common ground of explanation for the phenomena of erotic and hypnotic identification which they have not hitherto possessed.

(d) The cases quoted by Freud in his book, *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego* (in Section 7, which deals with Identification), should probably also be taken as instances of genuine (pathological) identification. There is the illustration (p. 64) in which a school-girl receives a letter from someone she secretly loves; her jealousy is aroused, and she reacts with an attack of hysterics, by which some of her friends are psychically infected, so that they also 'catch' the fit. Freud comments: 'It would be wrong to suppose that they take on the symptom out of sympathy. On the contrary, the sympathy only arises out of the identification, and this is proved by the fact that infection or imitation of this kind takes place in circumstances where even less pre-existing sympathy is to be assumed than usually exists between friends in a girls' school.' Freud's first observation is certainly just. I should only question whether 'sympathy' arises at all here. For sympathy presupposes just that awareness of distance between selves which is eliminated here by the identification.²

(e) The mental life of *children*, which in so many respects differs, not in degree but in kind, from that of the adult,³ also exhibits a type of identification analogous to these pathological cases. Thus, in the 'make-believe' of children, and still more when they

¹ Op. cit., p. 23.

² Cf. the cases of self-identification quoted earlier from Freud's *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego*.

³ Cf. E. R. Jaensch: *Eidetic Imagery: Typological methods of Investigation: their Importance for the Psychology of Childhood* (tr. by Oscar Oeser), Kegan Paul, 1924. In certain children there occurs as a primary experience what Jaensch calls 'eidetic imagery', an intermediate form of awareness between 'perceiving' and 'imagining', out of which there develops, along diverging lines, the disparity in act and content between perception and imagination in the adult.

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are taken to see a play or a puppet-show, the situation is very different from the parallel cases in which the adult 'play-acts' or indulges—as they say—in æsthetic 'empathy'. What is empathy in the adult is self-identification for the child. What is only 'play' to the adult is 'in earnest' to the child, and at least for the time being 'reality'. Consider the charming example given by Leo Frobenius, of the child playing 'Hansel, Gretel and the witch' with three burnt matches.¹ Even Freud's case of the child and the dead kitten belongs more to child-psychology than psychopathology. In the child's mind, individual self-awareness is still too unstable and incoherent to resist the childish capacity, which far exceeds the adult's, for ecstatic surrender to some eidetically projected personage. When the little girl plays at 'mother' with her doll, the make-believe character of the play, the 'Let's pretend that I'm Mother', is apparent only to the adult onlooker. In the act of playing the child feels herself (in the image of her own mother in relation to herself), completely identified with 'mother' (which still stands for an individual here, and is not an expression of general reference); the doll she identifies with herself. Hence it also comes about that the child's reaction in a theatre may so easily be quite unlike the adult's.

(f) Some particular cases of *divided consciousness* recorded by T. K. Oesterreich may also be regarded as instances of genuine identification, alternating, however, with awareness of self-identity; Oesterreich himself attributes them to identification, and the same applies, perhaps, to certain phenomena of 'possession', of which he has also recently given us a valuable account.² The particularly enlightening thing about these examples of self-identification is that they do not come about progressively, through the imitative performance of individual utterances, gestures or actions, but in a sudden leap, as it were; they thus betray the fact that (as in Flournoy's case of the woman who sometimes fancied she was Marie Antoinette), it is the prior state of self-identification with the other person which, throughout a succession of external circumstances quite out of keeping for the historical Marie Antoinette, is responsible for the wholly automatic reproduction of appropriate behaviour in matters of detail.

(g) I distinguish a further case of genuine identification, belonging neither to the idiopathic type in which the one individual self despotizes, as it were, over the other, nor to the heteropathic

¹ *Paideuma*, p. 59. [*Translator's note*: The child becomes so terrified by her own 'eidetic image' of the witch, that she cries to her father, 'Come and take the witch away. I daren't touch her.']

² T. K. Oesterreich: *Possession, Demoniacal and Other* (tr. by D. Ibberson), Kegan Paul, 1930.

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in which the one self is entirely 'lost' in the other; it is that type of identification characterized by what I call the phenomenon of 'mutual coalescence'. The most elementary form of this is certainly to be found in *truly loving sexual intercourse* (i.e. the opposite of the sensual, utilitarian, or purposive act), when the partners, in an impassioned suspension of their spiritual personality (itself the seat of individual self-awareness),¹ seem to relapse into a *single* life-stream in which nothing of their individual selves remains any longer distinct, though it has equally little resemblance to a consciousness of 'us' founded on the respective self-awareness of each.² This phenomenon was doubtless the chief source of the primitive vitalistic metaphysics underlying the Bacchic orgies and mysteries, which led their initiates to believe themselves plunged back again into the one primæval source of *natura naturans*, with an ecstatic dissolution of all individuality.

(h) But the phenomenon of identification through coalescence is certainly not confined to the erotic sphere. It also reappears in the psychic life of the unorganized *group*, as Le Bon first described it. Here too there is not only an identification of all members with the leader, the despotic idiopath (who therefore cannot and must not merge himself in the collective consciousness); there is also a *further* outcome (engendered by cumulative and reciprocal infection), in the mutual coalescence of the members into a *single* stream of instinct and feeling, whose pulse thereafter governs the behaviour of all its members, so that ideas and schemes are driven wildly before it, like leaves before a storm. The nature and activity of the collective consciousness certainly displays a six-fold analogy with the consciousness found subliminally in dreams, in hypnosis, in animals, primitive peoples and children—the mob is a 'beast' and an 'overgrown child'—and lastly in many pathological states, especially the hysterical ones. But though Freud considers the emergence of this group mind to be closely related to erotic coalescence, the demonstrable links in his group-psychology are still too few for me. Freud defines the primary group as 'a number of individuals who have substituted one and the same object (the leader and hero or an "idea" derived from him) for their ego-ideal, and have consequently identified themselves with one another (in their ego)'.³ The binding force here is said to be 'libido', in so far as it has already been permanently diverted from sexual objectives

¹ Cf. *Der Formalismus in der Ethik*, p. 284 seq.

² Cf. Wagner's descriptive tone-poem in *Tristan*, also Gerhard Hauptmann's *Heretic of Soana*, Martin Secker, 1923.

³ Freud: *Group Psychology*, op. cit., p. 80. [*Translator's note*: The first parenthesis is an interpolation of Scheler's; the second restores a phrase omitted by him.]

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and repressed into the unconscious. This hypothesis, if true, would explain in terms of a *single* notion a wide range of hitherto unconnected phenomena (e.g. hypnosis, which Freud describes as 'a group formation with two members');¹ but it seems to me not yet ripe for judgement, so long as the basic problems of the Freudian theory of love and sexuality remain unclarified.²

(i) A large number of earlier writers (among others Von Hartmann and Bergson), have adopted the identification-theory of love, i.e. the formula that 'love' of another consists in assimilating the other's self into one's own by means of identification; the typical case of identification of character which either leads these authors direct to the theory or provides the best supporting evidence for it, is the bond between *mother and child*. Here, indeed, we have the special, unique case in which the loved one really was once a spatial, corporeal 'part' of the one who loves. Here too there seems to be a smooth and continuous development among the various experiential factors, active and passive, which are involved; those which go to prepare the way for conception (procreative and sexual impulses), those which accompany pregnancy (gradual transformation of the procreative and self-preserving impulses into stirrings of the parental instinct, already awakened before birth itself), and those which are attendant, finally, on the nursing of the child once delivered (gradual transformation of the parental instinct into the conscious sentiment of *mother-love*). In this we pass over the still obscure question whether, just as digestion (according to Pavlov), requires 'appetite' (and a corresponding secretion of gastric juices), so effective conception may similarly require a psychic factor, say an awakening of the involuntary reproductive urge. But in any case one cannot appeal to such facts, as von Hartmann does, in order to establish that love is just an extended form of egoism, or (more reasonably), an extension of the instinct of self-preservation beyond the immediate self, by the adoption of another self into one's own. The facts themselves tell quite another tale. Even before birth the parental and nursing instincts are manifestly quite *distinct* from the impulse of self-preservation. The natural horror of abortion, for which the motives are naturally those of self-preservation, shows this plainly enough. Even before birth the mother regards herself and her child as *two* entities, the impulses appropriate to each being distinct even as phenomena. There is no sort of continuous development from self-preservation (and its

¹ Freud: *Group Psychology*, op. cit., p. 78.

² On this question cf. also Schilder's already quoted book, *Das Wesen der Hypnose* and our treatment of Freud's ontogenetic theory, Pt. II, ch. 6, sec 5 *infra*.

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impulses) into maternal love. The psychic continuity lies, rather, between the reproductive and parental instincts. The 'self-sacrifice' of the mother for the preservation of her young, so often recorded even among animals, displays an independence, an antagonism of the two impulses which certainly does not arise in the first place as an outcome of gestation, being already present beforehand, and distinguishable in the phenomena themselves. So far from speaking of the mother-child relationship, with von Hartmann, as the mother's assimilation of the child into her own self (and will to survive), it would be more appropriate to describe it as a progressive approximation to an identification of the mother with her child in the shape of an ecstatic *self-devotion* to its individuality. The dreamy state of a woman absorbed in contemplation of her present and future role as a mother is just such a state of kinæsthetic ecstasy, as it were, in which the presence of the child-to-be is disclosed to her. But even the continuity between the parental instincts and what we are first entitled to call mother-love is not so complete as is often asserted. I would say, indeed, that instinct and love very often run counter to one another here. Instinct, the outcome of the female reproductive urge, is all the more obviously at work so long as the child is young and still lacks an independent personality of its own. The unremitting solicitude of those mothers who are most 'motherly' in this respect is often a positive hindrance to any kind of independent development of personality in the child, and frequently retards its mental and spiritual growth the more, in seeking to promote its physical welfare. Such continual solicitude, fussing and foolish fondness is proverbially attributed to hens.¹ Does it not seem as if the purely maternal instinct—unmixed with love—were seeking to draw the child back, as it were, into the protecting womb? It is maternal love which first checks this tendency, directing itself upon the child as an independent being, slowly making his way from the darkness of mere physical life into the increasing light of consciousness. Like love generally, it conceives the child in its *terminus ad quem*, not, as instinct does, in its *terminus a quo*.

It is only in respect of the *instinctive* components of the whole relationship that one should properly speak of the mother's identifying herself with the impulses, the changing desires and needs of the child. Yet where these components are concerned, it is assuredly not by an empirical understanding and attunement to the symptomatic expression of its changing needs and conditions that the mother is first led to the actions appropriate to the care of her child; it seems to me, rather, that these physical signs are but the transitory outcome of a deeper *metempirical* nexus between

¹ [To monkeys, in the German.—Tr.]

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the vital rhythms of the mother and the internal phases in the life of the child. Thus the rhythm of lactation and milk-tension in the mother betrays an adaptation to the rhythm of the child's recurring hunger, which likewise holds between the satisfaction afforded to the mother by suckling and to the child by taking the breast. The stirrings of the urge to suckle *correspond* with those of the child's hunger, and it is this which chiefly enables the mother to discern the rhythmic phases of the child's need to be fed. She bears within her (in a manner but little understood), something like a biological code of signals for the progress of her child's condition, which allows her to 'know' about the child in a more intimate fashion than is possible for anyone else. When the mother awakens at the slightest sound from her child (but not in response to much stronger stimuli from other sources), the stimulus does not merely evoke the image of an utterance from the child which then has to be understood; it operates directly upon the ever-watchful parental instinct, transmuting it into an activity which only thereafter brings to light what would otherwise have been necessary before understanding could take place. Thus a mother can make intuitive prognoses for the turn of a child's illness, which often astonish the doctor. This is why mother-love has been held so indispensable in every age and clime, and not merely because of the greater solicitude it displays. The intuitive *psycho-somatic unity* of mother and child is not so entirely severed by their physical separation that its place can be *wholly* taken by the interpretation of organic symptoms through a system of physical signs.

(K) Jules Fabre's book *Souvenirs Entomologiques*—that inexhaustible storehouse of precise descriptions of instinctive behaviour—gives an account of certain hymenoptera which are able to sting (without killing), so as to paralyse spiders, beetles and caterpillars, in order to lay their eggs upon them; and Bergson has interpreted these facts as closely connected with sympathy. This stinging is carried out so skilfully, and is (in general), so evidently adapted to the anatomy of the nervous system and to the aim of paralysing without killing, that a surgeon with a scientific knowledge of the caterpillar's nervous system could do no better than the wasp does without any previous experience. There is such an unmistakably deliberate and objective co-ordination of the steps—the choice of nerve-centre for the sting: the living paralysis of the caterpillar: the deposition of eggs by the wasp—that it is quite hopeless to try to explain this as a chain-reflex or as due to the accumulation of inherited experience. This is Bergson's view, and also that of Hans Driesch, who applies it generally, for all true instincts.¹

¹ [Cf. also Max Scheler: *Die Stellung des Menschen im Kosmos* (1927), Munich, 1947.]

Chapter III

THE PERCEPTION OF OTHER MINDS

THE difficulties of this problem are mostly self-engendered, owing to the assumption that each of us is 'primarily' aware only of his own self and its experiences, and that among these only a proportion of such experiences, images, etc., are related to other individuals. The question then arises: (1) how can this portion be distinguished from that other portion which relates only to the self and its own experience? (2) How does the portion relating to others acquire a title to make us acquainted with the actual existence of other people? There have been two ways of resolving these difficulties hitherto: the theory of analogical inference, whereby, on perceiving expressive movements similar to those which we experience in ourselves in consequence of our own individual self-activity, we infer a similar self-activity in others; and the theory especially associated with Theodor Lipps, whereby this assumption involves a belief in the existence of mind in others, based upon a process of empathic projection of the self into the physical manifestations evinced by the other.¹ Neither of these theories succeeds in achieving its object.

As a theory of origins, the *analogical argument* has already been subjected to damaging criticism by Riehl and Lipps. For one thing—as Hume had already noted—this belief is undoubtedly found in animals as well, though they certainly do not perform analogical inferences. Wolfgang Köhler, in his *Mentality of Apes*,

¹ Lipps also relies upon a blind belief to substantiate the existence of mental life in the past, of which, again, we only have an interpreted picture, in the shape of a memory image. And he gives similar grounds for assuming the existence of an external world. This is at least consistent. For Lipps ensures thereby that the existence of other selves is at any rate no less and no different in its certainty than the existence of minds in the past and of the external world.

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says that 'by suddenly showing signs of the greatest terror, while staring at a certain spot as though possessed, it is not difficult to make all the chimpanzees in the station look at the same place at once. Immediately all the black company starts as if it had been struck by lightning, and proceeds to stare at the same spot, even though there is nothing there at all to be seen.' According to the usual view, this involves an analogical inference concerning 'my consciousness'. It is hardly possible to attribute inference by analogy to a twenty-five-day old baby. Yet Miss Ghinn¹ says of her niece that she already showed signs of an interest in human faces at about this time, long before she reacted to simple colour-stimuli. Again, it is the inflections of the human voice and not just the simple auditory stimuli thereof, which first arouse attention and interest. According to W. Stern's studies of the psychology of childhood, it is already observable in the second month of life that the child does not remain indifferent to the face and voice of his mother, but responds with 'a gentle smile'. By the middle of the first year it is possible to notice a variable response to different facial expressions on the part of the parents. Koffka very rightly says of this: 'It would appear therefore, that phenomena such as "friendliness" and "unfriendliness" are extremely primitive—even more so perhaps, than that of a blue spot.'² From these facts and others like them, we conclude that 'expression' is indeed the very *first* thing that man apprehends of what lies outside him, and that he only goes on to apprehend sensory appearances of any kind, inasmuch and insofar as they can be construed as *expressions* of mind. Not only is there no question here of an analogical inference; there can be equally little room for the complicated 'processes of assimilation', postulated in the works of Erdmann,³ in order to account for the first stages of 'understanding'. The rags and tatters of sensation from which associationism endeavours to piece together our picture of the world are just pure fictions. In the case of the primitive, so well described by Lévy-Brühl, we might perhaps go further and say that everything whatsoever is given, for him, as 'expression', and that what we call development through learning is not a subsequent addition of mental elements to an already-given inanimate world of material objects, but a continuous process of disenchantment, in that only a proportion of sensory appearances retain their function as vehicles of expression, while others do not. Learning, in this sense, is not *animation*, but a continual '*de-animation*'. One should

¹ M. W. Ghinn: *The Mental Development of a Child*, University of California Studies, Vol. I, 4.

² Cf. Koffka, op. cit., p. 134.

³ Benno Erdmann: *Grundzüge der Reproduktionspsychologie*, Berlin, 1920.

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not impute to children or primitives the world-view of a civilized adult, and then go on to postulate real processes in order to transform this picture back into that of the child or the primitive. Lévy-Brühl has rightly censured this procedure in Herbert Spencer and others.¹ Moreover, we are indeed conscious of our expressive movements, but apart from mirrors and suchlike, such consciousness takes the form, merely, of intentions to *move*, and of the consequences which follow from sensations of movement or state; while in the case of others, the primary data are represented by the visual images of such movements, which have *no* sort of immediate resemblance or similarity to the data encountered in our own case. The fact of the matter is, then, that we only make analogical inferences when we already take the existence of some other animate beings for granted, and are acquainted with their inner life, but are in doubt, on encountering expressive movements which resemble those of other beings better known to us, as to whether a given movement has an expressive significance (in the case of the lower animals, for instance). But even in this case (which resembles the situation in which we construe the gestures of the insane, or where we suspect someone of 'putting it on'), the analogical inference never yields a presumption of the existence of mind in general, but only a conjecture as to its presence in this particular case,² or as to the particular kind of experience that may be going on just now, such as remembering, attending, enjoying, etc. Thirdly, there can be no doubt that we also assume the presence of mind in creatures whose expressive movements (and 'actions') have no resemblance to our human ones (e.g. in birds, fish and so on). Lastly, this argument from analogy—even if it were used, and the data for it were available, and it were always employed wherever this assumption is made—would never lead to the content of the assumption in question. For such an argument would be logically correct (and not a fallacy of four terms), only if it implied that on the occurrence of expressive movements similar to those I perform myself, *it is my own self that is present here as well—and not some other and alien self*. If the conclusion refers to an alien self distinct from my own, it

¹ Cf. Koffka's excellent comments, *op. cit.*, pp. 336–55, on the 'world of the child'.

² Becher remarks on this point that if mind is present in another in any particular case, the existence of other minds in general is confirmed thereby. This is undeniable. But the crucial point is that to treat a movement or bodily occurrence as an 'expression' is already to presuppose the presence of mentality in the organism as a *whole*, and that a particular attribute (pleasure, etc.) can only be inferred if the actual presence of mind, as well as the specific relationship between experience and expressive attribute, is already taken for granted.

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is a false conclusion, an instance of the fallacy of four terms.¹ Finally, let us consider what is involved in this assumption. It entails that there are other conscious individuals, who, as such, are different from myself. But the analogical argument can never, in any case, imply the existence of other selves, except in so far as they are like myself; and hence it can never establish the existence of other conscious individuals.

But the *theory of belief and empathy* is equally nugatory in this respect. It provides a hypothesis concerning the manner in which this assumption is arrived at. But it can never assure us of the *legitimacy* of the assumption itself. For all that the theory seeks to establish is a 'blind' belief, not a self-evident intuition or even a rational postulate (such as would naturally be the outcome of the analogical argument). For it would be pure chance that the process of empathy should coincide with the actual presence of mind in the bodies so perceived. Hence the theory of empathy is wholly incapable of pointing to any sort of difference which may exist between that group of cases in which we wrongly impute a self or a soul to something (as, for example, in the 'animism' of primitives and children, and of mythology), and those other cases in which mind is actually present, as for instance in our fellow-men. Nor can the theory distinguish empathy as a source of our knowledge of other minds from the merely *aesthetic* projection of content and character on the part of the self, into a portrait, for instance, or the embodiment of Hamlet, a personage belonging to the world of art, in the gestures of an actor. Indeed there is no telling here, which data are supposed to set off the process of empathy in oneself. Will *any* sort of visual content do for this purpose? Assuredly not, for we do not 'project' ourselves into any visual content we please. The theory is that perception of '*expressive movements*' is required, or at least the behaviour of a *living* creature of some kind. But this answer does not help matters. For the realization that certain seen movements represent expressive movements already presupposes knowledge of the presence of another mind of some kind. The recognition that they are 'expressive' is not the source but the *outcome* of this belief. Moreover, the reference to 'living creatures' will not do here, for the empathy theory itself denies the existence of an independent, objective

¹ Becher's attempt (op. cit) to prove that there is no such fallacy here does not seem to me to be successful. It is not a question of how we come to postulate the occurrence of isolated experiences which are simply not our own, but of how we arrive at the notion of another self, which does not have 'our' experiences, just because they are *his*, i.e. those of another self. This existence of the other self is given to us prior to the particular experiences enjoyed by this other self. The step from one's own self to another's is quite unlike the step from any such given self to a second, a third and so on.

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phenomenon of 'life', given in external perception, whose manifestations are taken to be 'alive' because they exhibit this *primary phenomenon*. For even the appearance of life itself is likewise to be explained in terms of an empathic projection of our own *feeling* of life, i.e. of a psychological fact.¹ We should therefore have to reckon with a two-fold process of empathy here: firstly, a projection of our 'feeling of life' into certain sensory complexes, and secondly, a projection of *selfhood* which is then imposed upon the whole of this already 'animate' complex. But this is merely to shift the problem. For it must now be asked: in the presence of which objective data can the projection of a 'feeling of life' be justified?² When all is said, the theory of empathy offers no grounds for assuming the existence of other selves, let alone other individuals. For it can only serve to confirm the belief that it is *my* self which is present 'all over again', and never that this self is other and different from my own. It could only confirm the latter by virtue of a misconception.³ We should also pay heed to the fact that we not only know that there are other individual mental selves, but also that we know we can never grasp these adequately in their unique individual essence. For we certainly do know this. It is not a matter of apprehending the self as a particular individuality merely because we encounter it in association with another body; we know that the self we apprehend is itself an *individual*, and one that is distinct from our own self, and only so do we know it to be 'another's'. We do not take it to be an individual, because it is another's. To know of the existence of an individual self it is quite unnecessary to be acquainted with its body. For wherever we meet with *signs* or *traces* of its spiritual activity, in a work of art, for instance, or in the felt unity of a voluntary action, we immediately encounter in this an active individual self. Xenophon rightly observes that if, in order to establish the existence of an historic personage, it were necessary to start from the reports of those who had actually seen him in the flesh, we would not be able to credit the historical existence of Pisistratus, for example, since none of the authors of our sources ever saw him. But in spite of this, we

¹ I propose to show elsewhere how wrongly the facts of life have been interpreted by the empathy theory, closely associated as it is with the mechanistic outlook of post-Cartesian biology. There are few more important tasks for present-day philosophy than to provide a phenomenological basis for the knowledge of life, and hence to give biology a place in the field of epistemology that is independent of physics and chemistry, no less than of psychology.

² Moreover, how are we to give an exact account of the 'feeling of life', if the appearance of 'life' is first derived from a process of empathy, which cannot therefore be guided by an already prior notion of the appearance of life?

³ But once this mistake was realized, solipsism would be the only logical outcome.

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can clearly trace the individual unity of his political influence in Athenian politics: and this allows us to assume that he did really exist. As against this, we do not believe in the existence of the devil, for instance, although a great many people have claimed to have seen him in the flesh.¹

There is, in general, no warrant at all for the assumption that consciousness of the self as an individual is first presented by way of its expressive activity, or through the *bodily* consciousness associated with this—or, objectively speaking, through physical correlates in the nervous system and the fact that they relate to one particular body, or again by virtue of the particular empirical *contents* of experience (as given in inner perception); for apart from these differentiating elements, such a self would be simply the *idea* of a consciousness in general, the mere ‘form of a consciousness’. Whereas it might be the case that absolutely identical bodies and contents of physical consciousness were associated with quite different individual selves. Even identical behaviour and attitudes may have quite different mental associations. I am not, of course, saying (as Lipps does) that my body is ‘mine’ only because I am acquainted with ‘myself’ as an individual, and thereby know myself to be active as this experiencing individual. This seems to me to overstate the case. What happens, rather, is that I experience my body as mine (and the body of another as belonging to someone else), because I know that both self and body (in its mental and physical aspects) belong to one and the same concrete individual person. Both self and body acquire their ultimate individual character from their evident connection with the unitary *person*.² And hence it is not the content of consciousness (what I think, feel, will and so on), which serves to individualize the self. Exactly the same experiences (as they would appear to an ideally perfect inner perception), could still belong to quite different individual selves. An individual mind is never the mere ‘collection’ or ‘sum’ of its experiences; or a synthesis of such experiences whose subject is supposed to be a so-called ‘supra-individual’ conscious activity, a ‘consciousness in general’. On the contrary, an experience only becomes a concrete experience (and not just the notion or semblance of such a thing), inasmuch as I thereby apprehend an individual self *in* it, or as it becomes a *symbol* to me for the presence of such an individual.³ Hence it is not just isolated

¹ Ultimately, wherever we find ‘rational’ unities of meaning exhibited in some ‘material’ form, we are necessarily obliged to postulate certain relevant acts, and to attribute these acts to a centre of personality which has imposed this ‘meaning’ on the material.

² On the concept of personality see my *Formalismus*, op. cit., ch. VI.

³ Cf. my essay on ‘*Idole der Selbsterkenntnis*’ op. cit.; and H. Bergson: *Introduction to Metaphysics* (1913).

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experiences that I apprehend in another, but always the individual's mental character *as a whole* in its total expression. Small quantitative variations in the organs (such as the nose, mouth, eyes, etc.), which exhibit this, can alter this character completely, whereas greater changes elsewhere leave it wholly unaffected. I can tell from the expressive 'look' of a person whether he is well or ill disposed towards me, long before I can tell what colour or size his eyes may be.

But now let us enquire if the twofold starting-point of these two theories is *phenomenologically accurate*: (1) that it is always *our own self, merely, that is primarily given to us*; (2) that what is primarily given in the case of others is merely the *appearance of the body*, its changes, movements, etc., and that only on the strength of this do we somehow come to accept it as animate and to presume the existence of another self.

Both assumptions commend themselves as self-evident, and both readily appeal to the fact that 'it could not be otherwise'. How indeed could we think any other thoughts, feel any other feelings than 'our own'? And how else should we come to know of the existence of another human being if not by first perceiving his body? What else is there to perceive of him except his body? It is only from thence that our sense-organs receive stimuli, and only by means of such physical processes can there be any intercourse between individual minds.

Let us remember, however, that there is nothing of which the philosopher must be more wary than of taking something to be self-evident, and then, instead of looking to see what is *given*, turning his attention to what 'can be given' according to some supposed realistic theory. For it will be evident that the foregoing assumptions involve a complete departure from the phenomenological standpoint, replacing it—and covertly at that—by a realistic one.

(1) For who can say that it is our *own* individual self and its experiences which are 'immediately given' in that mode of intuition, by which alone the mental, a self and its experiences, can possibly be apprehended, namely in inner intuition or perception? Where is the phenomenological evidence for this assertion?¹

What is the meaning of the proposition that 'a man can only think his own thoughts and feel his own feelings?' What is 'self-

¹ The act of 'inner perception' is of a different *polarity* from that of 'outer perception' (and one in which there is no necessity for it to operate through sensory functions, let alone the sense-organs). This distinction obviously has nothing to do with what is 'inside' or 'outside' for any given individual. 'Inner perception' is essentially concerned with apprehension of the mental, and it makes no difference to this whether perception is of oneself or another. On this subject cf. also the essay on 'Idole der Selbsterkenntnis', op. cit.

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evident' about it? This only, that if once we postulate a *real substratum* for the experiences, of whatever kind, which I may happen to have, then all the thoughts and feelings which occur in me will in fact belong to this real substratum. And that is a tautology. Two real substrata, two soul-substances, for instance, or two brains, certainly cannot enter into one another, or switch from one to the other. But for the moment let us leave such questionable metaphysical hypotheses to one side. However, if we do seriously abandon these and all the presuppositions of realism in general, and stick to pure phenomenology, our proposition loses all semblance of being 'self-evident'. For nothing is more certain than that we can think the thoughts of others as well as our own, and can feel their feelings (in sympathy) as we do our own. Are we not for ever distinguishing 'our own' thoughts from those we have read or which have been told to us? 'Our own' feelings from those we merely reproduce, or by which we have been infected (unconsciously, as we later realize)? 'Our own' will from that which we merely obey and which is plainly manifest to us at the time as the will of another, just as we distinguish our own true will from that which we are deceived into thinking our own, though it has been suggested to us by someone else, in hypnosis, for instance? Even in these very trivial examples we find a string of 'possible' cases of what is supposed, on present assumptions, to be 'self-evidently' impossible. It may well be that our thoughts are presented 'as' our own, and those of others as theirs, e.g. in merely understanding a piece of information. That is the normal case. But it may also happen that the thought of another is not presented as such, but as a thought of ours. Such is the case, for instance, in 'unconscious reminiscence' of things read or communicated. It also occurs when, imbued with a genuine tradition, we accept the thoughts of others, e.g. of our parents or teachers, as thoughts of our own: we then 'reproduce' such thoughts (or feelings) vicariously, without being explicitly conscious of the function of intellectual or emotional reproduction. And hence they appear to us as our own. It may also happen that one of our own thoughts or feelings is presented as belonging to someone else. Thus the mediæval writers were often given to reading their own thoughts or those of their own time into the sources and documents of classical antiquity, thereby fathering Christian modes of thought upon Aristotle, for example. Whereas the tendency in modern times has been to take up ideas which have been unconsciously acquired and thought a thousand times, and put them forward as new and original, the older (mediæval) habit was to extract ideas which actually were new and original from such authors as were invested with special authority. The latter represents the case of

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'delusive empathy'. Just because the process of empathy is not explicit here, the individual's experience appears to him as having been derived from someone else.

It is possible, therefore, as these examples show, for the same experiences to be given both 'as our own' and 'as someone else's'; but there is also the case in which an experience is simply given, *without presenting itself either as our own or as another's*, as invariably happens, for example, where we are in doubt as to which of the two it is.¹

Yet it is this level of 'givenness' which represents the common starting-point for the elaboration of an ever nicer distribution of the material of experience so given between ourselves and other people; an ever more precise appropriation of 'our own' and repudiation of what belongs to 'others'. It is not the case therefore, as these theories suppose, that we have to build up a picture of other people's experiences from the immediately given data furnished by our own, and then to impute these experiences, which have no intrinsic marks of 'foreignness' about them, to the physical semblances of other people. What occurs, rather, is an immediate flow of experiences, *undifferentiated as between mine and thine*, which actually contains both our own and others' experiences intermingled and without distinction from one another. Within this flow there is a gradual formation of ever more stable vortices, which slowly attract further elements of the stream into their orbits and thereby become successively and very gradually identified with distinct individuals. But the essential links in the process are simply the facts: (1) that every experience belongs *in general to a self*, so that wherever an experience is given a self is also given, in a general sense; (2) that this self is necessarily an *individual self*, present throughout every experience (in so far as such experiences are adequately given), and not therefore primarily constituted by the interconnection between them. (3) that *there is an 'I' and a 'Thou' in a general sense*. But which individual self it may be, that owns a given experience, whether it is our own or another's, is something that is not necessarily apparent in the experience as immediately presented.

But if there is a general human *tendency* to err in one of these two directions rather than the other, it is certainly not the error of empathy, so-called, whereby we impute our own experience to others, but the *opposite* tendency, in which we entertain the experi-

¹ To be sure, even a thought so given is related to the self in a purely formal sense, for that is part of its nature. But this 'self' is merely a cypher in the formal multiplicity and unity of consciousness—not something experienced, let alone one's 'own' self, which can only be presented by contrast, in relation to some 'other' or 'alien' self.

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ences of other people as if they were our own. In other words, a man tends, in the first instance, to live more in *others* than in himself; more in the community than in his own individual self. This is confirmed by the facts of child-psychology, and also in the thought of all primitive peoples. The ideas, feelings and tendencies which govern the life of a child, apart from general ones such as hunger and thirst, are initially confined entirely to those of his immediate environment, his parents and relatives, his elder brothers and sisters, his teachers, his home, his people, and so on. Imbued as he is with 'family feeling', his own life is at first almost completely hidden from him. Rapt, as it were, and hypnotized by the ideas and feelings of this concrete environment of his, the only experiences which succeed in crossing the threshold of his inner awareness are those which fit into the sociologically conditioned patterns which form a kind of channel for the stream of his mental environment. Only very slowly does he raise his mental head, as it were, above this stream flooding over it, and find himself as a being who also, at times, has feelings, ideas and tendencies of his own. And this, moreover, only occurs to the extent that the child *objectifies* the experiences of his environment in which he lives and partakes, and thereby gains *detachment* from them. The mental content of experience that is virtually absorbed 'with one's mother's milk' is not the result of a transference of ideas, experienced as something 'communicated'. For communication entails that we understand the 'communicated content' as proceeding from our informant, and that while understanding it we also appreciate its origin in the other person. But this factor is just what is absent in that mode of transference which operates between the individual and his environment. For in this case we do not primarily 'understand' the passing of a judgement or the expression of an emotion, or regard it as the utterance of another self. We fall in with it, without being consciously aware of the element of co-operation involved. And the effect of this is that we begin by regarding it as our *own* judgement or emotional reaction. It is only in recollection that the experience normally comes to have the character of something acquired from without, depending on how far we have succeeded by then, through maturity rather than knowledge, in separating our own experience (and its individual contents) from that of other people. But long before the child has ever reached the stage of being capable of a more precise *distinction* between himself and his mental environment, his consciousness is already filled with ideas and experiences of whose real origin he is completely unaware; and once he has begun to lay hold of experiences of his own which lie beyond this original communal threshold, he can call upon such ideas in order to make

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sense of his environment, because that is just where they have come from in the first place.¹

A similar immersion in the spirit of the community and conformity to the shapes and patterns of its flow, can also be seen in all primitive peoples. Just as speech exerts a profound influence on the silent and solitary life of the soul, so that if there is no *word* or other socially valid expression for an experience, the latter usually fails to stand out plainly from the stream of experience, so too, the possible *social relevance* and importance of an experience tends to intrude itself, like a selective form of apprehension, between pure internal perception and the experience itself, and hence virtually overshadows the private life of the individual, and conceals it, as it were, from the possessor himself. Though we nowadays regard it as a 'pathological' symptom (of hysteria, for instance), when a man's inner life appears to be involuntarily shaped according to the attitudes and standards of his environment, what is now held to be a 'pathological' trait is characteristic, like so many other similar features, of all primitive life whatsoever.² Thus the vengeful impulses of a member of the family or tribal unit in respect of any insult or injury towards a fellow-member of the same unit, is not due to fellow-feeling (which already postulates the apprehension of the suffering *as* endured by someone else), but to an immediate awareness of this insult or injury as affecting himself; a phenomenon which is directly based upon the fact that the individual begins by living in the community to a much greater extent than he does in himself.

But how then is it possible to observe the mental life of another person? Let us now go on from the phenomenological fact that a mental experience may be presented in 'internal perception' *regardless* of whether it is 'my' experience or (characteristically) someone else's, to the question how such a thing is possible. For is not 'internal perception' necessarily also a perception of *oneself*? Is it possible to have internal perception of the self and the inner life of *another* person?

This question has hitherto received an unhesitatingly negative answer for the simple reason that no distinction has been drawn

¹ This is why a *complete* understanding of the mental history of a people (or a religious community) can only be attained, in the last resort, by those who belong to the group in question and have been imbued with its traditions. Lamprecht also reaches this conclusion in his essay 'Kulturpolitik' (*Deutsche Revue*, December 1912).

² This primitive element must again be taken into account nowadays in the phenomena of crowd-psychology, which could easily be shown to contain much that would have to be regarded as 'pathological' in an individual case. Thus it is possible, for example, to rediscover in the mental processes of crowds a whole range of phenomena characteristic of hysteria.

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between the sphere of internal intuition (or those of internal perception, representation, feeling and the like), and the sphere of 'inner sense'. But 'internal intuition' can certainly not be defined by reference to its object, by saying that a person engaged in such intuition is perceiving 'himself'. For I can perceive myself in an external sense just as much as I can perceive anyone else. Every glance at my own body, every touch upon it, confirms the fact. If I touch my thumb with my middle finger, the double sensation still consists of one and the same sensory content at the surfaces of the two separate parts of the body. Thus internal perception represents a polarity among acts, such acts being capable of referring both to ourselves *and* to others. *This polarity is intrinsically capable of embracing the inner life of others as well as my own*, just as it embraces myself and my own experience *in general*, and not merely the immediate present. To be sure, certain conditions are required before the experiences of others can be presented to me in the act of internal intuition. But these are equally necessary if I am to be aware of my own personal experience. They certainly include the ontological condition that my body should be subject to effects whose causes are located in, or proceed from, the other's body. For instance, the air-waves set in motion by his utterances must reach my ear if I am to understand what he says. But there is no reason why this condition *should entirely determine the act whereby these words are understood*. The condition itself can be explained by reason of the facts: (1) that every act of possible internal perception is associated with a similar act of possible external perception; and (2) that the act of external perception does in fact have an external sensory basis as well. The process whereby individual A is apprised of an experience in individual B must operate, in these circumstances, 'as if' this experience must first have evoked certain physical modifications in B, and these a similar series of modifications in A, to be followed, in consequence, by an experience in A similar or comparable to that possessed by B. But in actual fact the internal perception of A is intrinsically capable of apprehending B's experience *immediately*, and these causal processes serve only to determine when the act in question shall take place, and again to select its particular content from within the possible field of internal perceptions of other people.¹

If the above-mentioned account of the matter were true, the

¹ Even in external perception the stimulus never determines the character of the thing perceived, but only the perception of this and no other character; and the same is true of the relationship between remembering and reproduction or association. But this can only be shown in the context of the general theory of knowledge which underlies what is said here. [Cf. on this the chapter 'Zur Philosophie der Wahrnehmung' in *Erkenntnis und Arbeit* (1926), op. cit.]

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objective course of events could only follow the course already indicated, whereby internal perception is wholly confined to one's own mental experiences, and the transference of an experience from B to A can only come about, objectively speaking, if B's experience affects his body, and this affects A's body, which then influences his 'soul' and thereby causes the production of a *similar* experience in him; so that A's knowledge of B's experience would depend upon inference, or the empathic projection of his own experience into B. But according to *our* account we are committed to saying that A's act of internal perception embraces not only his own mental processes, but has both the power and the right to take in the *whole* existing realm of minds—initially as a still unorganized stream of experiences. And just as we start by apprehending our present self against the background of our *whole* temporal experience, and do not manufacture it by a *synthesis* of our present self with earlier remembered states of itself, so too do we always apprehend our own self against the background of an ever-vaguer all-embracing consciousness in which our own existence and the experiences of everyone else are presented, in principle, as included together. It is not, therefore, the perception of other selves and their experiences, but only the particular content that stands out vividly at any time from this vast total content, the emergence of a self and of its experience from the great collective stream of universal consciousness, which is in fact conditioned by the bodily transactions which take place between us. From this point of view we gain a quite new insight, not to be found in the previous theory, into that strange interdependence between our self-knowledge and our understanding of others, described in the words of Schiller:

‘If you would know yourself, take heed of the practice of others;
If you would understand others, look to your own heart within
you’.¹

Anyone learning a foreign language realizes that only in doing so does he become aware of the special character of the meanings-units and other basic peculiarities of his own tongue. And is this any less true of all those other tendencies in experience and behaviour that are governed by national, local or professional concerns or otherwise unified in terms of a group? It is by virtue of *precisely the same act of discernment within an as yet undifferentiated whole* that we come to a clear realization *both of what is ours and of what belongs to others*.

¹ ‘Willst du dich selber erkennen, so sieh, wie die andern es treiben,
Willst du die andern verstehn, blick in dein eigenes Herz.’

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It is a fundamental weakness of theories which seek to derive our knowledge of other minds from inferences or processes of empathy, that they have an inveterate tendency to under-estimate the difficulty of self-knowledge, just as they over-estimate the difficulty of knowing other people. It is no longer realized in such cases that it is self-knowledge which has always been reckoned the most difficult, so that Nietzsche, for example, could utter the pregnant words, 'every man is farthest of all from himself' (from knowing himself, that is, and I should add that this is just *because* he is closest to himself in *practice*). What has been overlooked is that the degree of vividness necessary even in one of our own mental processes, before it can stand out from the vague whole of our own total experience at any time, is no more dependent on the mere act of internal perception than is a mental process in someone else; for both are *equally* dependent on their ability to occasion specific causal *changes* in the peripheral areas of the *bodily* self (or animate body). We only pay special attention to an experience of our own in so far as it discharges itself in intended movements, or at least in expressive tendencies. Thus it can easily be confirmed that when the expression of an emotion is violently repressed, this invariably has a tendency to repress it simultaneously from internal perception as well. When joy or love are inhibited in their expression they do not simply remain the same from the internal point of view, but tend to evaporate. If it were possible (which it is not), to go on to annihilate the *inner* expressive phenomena localized within the animate body, the experience would still continue to modify the field of internal awareness in some way, though it would no longer be accessible to individual inspection. Internal reading-movements are so closely bound up with the understanding of what is read, that if the tongue is immobilized, even the understanding of a newspaper is greatly impaired. These facts and others like them show that even prior to self-directed internal perception such an experience does not succeed in emerging from the total stream of life immediately, but only by means of the effect it has on the state of the *body*. In this respect, therefore, there is, at bottom, no very crucial difference between self-awareness and the perception of mind in others. Such perception occurs, in both cases, only so far as the state of the body is modified in some way and so far as the mental state to be perceived is translated into some sort of *expression* or other physical modification. Thus it is not merely another person's artistic intentions, for example, that I grasp through the process of their depiction and the result produced; for even my own artistic ideas only mature *in* the process of depiction and only attain a definite shape *in so far* as they are bound up with this

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process.¹ Just as the painter does not first see in order to depict, but only penetrates into the full colour and chiaroscuro of his overt subject in the process of depicting it, so likewise is self-perception possible only when its subject-matter is first translated into expressive tendencies.

It would therefore be quite wrong to suppose that we first simply perceive ourselves and our experiences, and then go on subsequently to take additional account of our expressive movements and tendencies, our actions, and their effect upon our bodily states. Such a purely 'intra-mental' self-perception is a complete fiction. The fact is that the articulation of the stream of consciousness and the ascription to it of those specific qualities of vividness which bring certain parts of it into the focus of internal perception, are *themselves governed* by the potential unities of action and expression (and the physical significance of these), which they are able to induce. Even the nature of our moral character is not apprehended by means of some pure antecedent self-intuition, completely divorced from the sphere of action, but only in the course of our actions themselves. It will also be evident from this how largely the actual direction of self-perception at any time, the selection of what we shall or shall not observe in ourselves, is dependent upon the prevailing fields of *attention* which the *environment* imposes upon us. An experience whose general character, whether of pity or vengeance, shame or joy, we know to lie, in general, within our environmental field of attention, even though we need not be attending to it at the moment, stands a much greater chance of being observed by us, even within ourselves. Without our realizing it, our experience largely shapes itself according to the disposition of our environmental fields of attention. Language again, with its psychological unities of meaning, intrudes its network of order and articulation between what we see and what we experience. Anything in our experience which can be put into words is always something which, having been singled out by common language, must also be accessible to others; and such experience presents a quite different appearance in internal perception from anything that is 'ineffable'. It is given *prior* to the ineffable. For this reason poets, and all makers of language having the 'god-given power to tell of what they suffer',² fulfil a far higher function than that of giving noble and beautiful expression to their experiences and thereby making them recognizable to the reader, by reference to his own past experience in this kind. For by creating new forms

¹ Cf. Karl Fiedler's æsthetic theory, more especially his book, *Ursprung der Kunsttätigkeit*. [Cf. also, in *Nachlassband*, I, Appendix to *Vorbilder und Führer*, the sections on the artist, and on conception and the process of representation.]

² [Goethe, *Marienbader Elegie*.]

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of expression the poets soar above the prevailing network of ideas in which our experience is confined, as it were, by ordinary language; they enable the rest of us to *see*, for the first time, in our own experience, something which may answer to these new and richer forms of expression, and by so doing they actually *extend* the scope of our *possible* self-awareness. They effect a real enlargement of the kingdom of the mind and make new discoveries as it were, within that kingdom. It is they who open up new branches and channels in our apprehension of the stream and thereby show us for the first time *what* we are experiencing. That is indeed the mission of all true art: not to reproduce what is already given (which would be superfluous), nor to create something in the pure play of subjective fancy (which can only be transitory and must necessarily be a matter of complete indifference to other people), but to press forward into the whole of the external world *and* the soul, to see and communicate those objective realities within it which rule and convention have hitherto concealed. The history of art may be seen, therefore, as a series of expeditions against the intuitable world, within and without, to subdue it for our comprehension; and that for a kind of comprehension which no science could ever provide. An emotion, for example, which everyone can now perceive in himself, must once have been wrested by some 'poet' from the fearful inarticulacy of our inner life for this clear perception of it to be possible: just as in commerce things (such as tea, coffee, pepper, salt, etc.), which were once luxuries, are nowadays articles of everyday use in general supply.

There are two metaphysical theories of the mind-body relationship which chiefly obstruct our understanding of the facts concerning our knowledge of other minds. The one is the old notion of interaction between two substances, i.e. the theory of a self-contained 'soul-substance', which can only operate on the soul of another via its causal influence on its own body, and the effect of the latter on the other's body. The other is that of 'psycho-physical parallelism', so-called, whose main postulate is that every mental event in A is accompanied by a corresponding event in A's body, so that a mental influence of A upon B would equally have to take place by way of the effect of their respective bodies on one another. Both theories would rule out the internal perception of other minds. For each of them, everyone lives immured in his own mental prison and must wait upon whatever the metaphysical causal nexus may spirit into it.¹ But

¹ If this parallelism is taken to imply a univocal interdependence of all mental and all physical events, we should also have to postulate 'mental' correlates for the sound and light waves which enable us to see and hear the other person,

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both these theories misapprehend the facts and neglect the *phenomena*.¹

Anything given in internal and external intuition that has physical (objectively observable) concomitants is not the pure qualitative content of such intuition, but only the givenness of that *portion* of its total content which continues to have an effect upon the body. Only the actual (though not therefore necessarily 'given') vital motor-impulses of the body and its various states are accompanied by parallel occurrences in the nervous system. The reason for this is simply that modification of the (internal) bodily system is itself a condition for the *emergence* of mental processes from within the field of internal intuition into the sphere of possible perception; hence it is indirectly the case that for every (perceptible) distinction, selection or abstraction within the total stream of consciousness, there are corresponding physical nerve-currents, which are a necessary condition, not for the content of the experience itself, but for the perception thereof. Thus the body as a whole simply serves to analyse, not only the givenness of the external world and what is 'picked out' from it, but also the stream of consciousness which continually tends to overflow its limits. Hence the brain and nervous system and all the events occurring in them merely determine what is *perceived*, but not the occurrence and content of mental processes. The function of the nervous system on the physical side is not essentially different from what it is on the mental. It is the condition for the *perception* of its character, not for the character itself, let alone for its existence. Just as there are no specific bodily processes governing the existence and character of the sun and moon, without which these bodies could not exist, it being only the manner in which they are presented to us (as discs of light in the sky) that is determined in this fashion, so too there are no specific conditions in the nervous system governing the existence and character of mental processes; though there *are* definite conditions determining the manner in which they are presented in internal perception. In other words the body and its changes merely condition the appearance or aspect that our experience presents to inner sense, but never the experience itself.

though these would naturally have been invented merely for the sake of the hypothesis. Such an assumption would also involve the acceptance of telepathy, as Sigwart has already done well to emphasize (*Logik*, Vol. II). There is much on this subject in T. K. Oesterreich's book on occult phenomena (*Possession, Demoniacal and Other*, Kegan Paul, 1930).

¹ The theory of mind and body so vaguely outlined above will only be rendered intelligible in the second volume of my *Metaphysics* which I shall shortly be preparing for publication. [Cf. *Die Stellung des Menschen im Kosmos*, 1927, and also, for the theory of perception, *Erkenntnis und Arbeit*, op. cit.]

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Hence there is no immediate causal connection, nor even a specific relation of dependence, between mental experience and events in the nervous system. All there is, in fact, is an indirect relationship of dependence between such events and the actually given content of inner sense-perception (i.e. the faculty of distinguishing among the data of internal intuition). This relationship is due to the fact that all changes in the body are accompanied by two other sets of changes: (1) nervous processes in the physical body, (2) changes in the bodily consciousness, which serve to determine which part of the totality of inner life is to enter internal awareness.¹

Now this enables us to account for a number of facts to which little attention has been paid hitherto. The only thing we can never perceive in our observation of others is their experience of their own *bodily states*, especially their organic sensations, and the sensory feelings attached thereto. It is these things which account for that particular *kind* of separateness among men which the above-mentioned theories attribute to the *whole* of mental life. Though there have been misguided attempts to draw a general distinction between the mental and the physical by asserting that the 'mental' is what can only be given to 'one' person at a time, this statement only applies, in fact, to organic sensations and sensory feelings.² The pain of another person, or the sensory enjoyment of his food, is something I can never perceive directly. All I can do is to reproduce a similar sensation of my own, and infer that in the presence of comparable stimuli the other person has a similar experience. But I cannot share it or reproduce it vicariously, as I can, for instance, the spiritual emotion of grief. The various states of the body in sensation and feeling are wholly confined to the body of the individual concerned. Hence an identical sorrow may be keenly felt (though in one's own individual fashion), but never an identical sensation of pain, for here there are always two separate sensations. Again, one may see the same shade of red as another person (without actually reducing the colour to wave-motions), or hear the same sound of C. But the aural and ocular sensations involved are accessible only to the possessor of the organs in question.

To the extent, therefore, that a man is predominantly concerned with his own bodily states, he will remain cut off from the

¹ Exactly the same situation arises in external perception. It is an error to suppose that Nature, its object, is dependent on the body in a manner intrinsically different to that of mental happenings. For all natural phenomena are equally made up of elements that are dependent on the body for their existence and others that are not so.

² For the notion of 'sensory feelings' (as distinct from vital, mental and spiritual feelings), cf. *Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiale Wertethik*, ch. V, § 8, 'Zur Schichtung des emotionalen Lebens'.

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mental life of his fellows (and indeed from his own). And it is only so far as he *surmounts* this and views his body with detachment, clearing his mental life of its ever-present sensory accompaniments, that the facts of mental life in others will become increasingly visible to him.

The act of internal perception, therefore, is not by nature an act which can only be directed upon the mental life of the perceiving himself, as if 'internal perception' and introspection amounted to the same thing. Our claim is, rather, that so far as concerns the act and its nature and the range of facts appearing within it, everyone can apprehend the experience of his fellow-men *just as directly (or indirectly)* as he can his own. It is only the inescapable difference in our physical circumstances, in so far as they govern the selection of that part of our purely mental life which appears in internal perception (in which capacity we describe them as 'inner sense'), which determines that though B may have had the same actual experience as A, the 'picture' that he has of it is always different from A's.¹

There have been a number of different attempts to establish that we can only have knowledge, or a clear conception of the constituents of mental life, by previous recourse to the defining properties of the object as it exists in *external* nature. Thus Natorp, in his *Einleitung in die Psychologie*, took the view that psychology must always be preceded by an 'objectification' of the given into an external natural object (by means of a 'transcendental synthesis') and that only from this standpoint is it possible, by means of a reconstructive process, to provide either a descriptive or an explanatory account of the mental experience; a sensation, for example, must be referred to its physical stimulus. Münsterberg also wishes to define the natural object as the element X which remains identifiable throughout a multiplicity of private acts or intersubjective transactions—so that the concept of the mental becomes, as it were, characteristic of what can only be given in one subjective act at a time, and therefore, in effect, to one person at a time. Such theories would make it impossible, by definition, for us to perceive the mind of another: indeed, even the perception of our own mental life could only be achieved indirectly, by taking the external natural object as our starting-point, in order to identify our experience as correlative to it. The logical consequence of such views is that the mental field has no sort of organic unity of its own, either in the subject himself, or in his relation to others; for, according to them, the only thing that can be regarded as 'mental' is that contingent residue of the 'given' which does not

¹ This 'picture' is not, of course, a particular real object but only a limited 'aspect' of the other's experience.

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happen to be included in the structure of the natural object or the regular causal connections within the body, so that there can therefore be no reason to think of it as constituting a continuous intelligible sequence on its own account. In short, the natural conclusion to be drawn from these premisses is epiphenomenalism, with its methodological aim of accounting for all rational connections within mental experience by reference to corresponding physiological and physico-chemical processes in the nervous system.

But all that these theories ultimately show is that from the 'natural point of view', in which, from the start, we are wholly absorbed in the external world, we often succumb to the illusion of taking a thing for a mental experience when it is actually given only as a physical object. It is Bergson's especial merit to have shown how we are all inclined to import a quasi-spatial multiplicity into the mental field, despite the fact that the two things are utterly unlike.¹ These theories therefore transform a particular and perhaps inveterate tendency to illusion on the part of internal perception into a 'condition of mental experience in general'. A further conclusion to which these theories are led is that, instead of regarding the body and its changes as a merely limiting condition for the perception of actual mental life, they think of it as a wholly determinant, independently variable causal sequence, such that mental events are themselves alleged to depend upon its interconnections. These conclusions are due to the misguided notion of the 'mental' as that which is only given to one person at a time, or cannot be identified throughout a multiplicity of subjective acts. But if the mental were only given to one person at a time, it could never be communicated. It is here that we notice how these theories assert of the mental in general what in fact applies only to physical sensations and sensory feelings.² Hence they invariably relapse in practice into sensationalism, the impossible attempt to trace the whole of experience back to 'sensations' and their derivatives.³ It is actually a complete mistake to

¹ Henri Bergson: *Time and Free Will* (authorized translation by F. L. Pogson) London, Macmillan, 1910.

² I pass over the fact that it is a complete error to suppose, with Münsterberg, that the principle of Identity is sufficient to justify the reduction of the phenomena to mechanical terms. For the same sound can certainly be perceived, imagined or remembered, and may equally be sensed by a number of subjects, without any need to characterize it, merely for the sake of identification, as a wave-motion. As to the real reasons conducing to this mechanistic reduction of natural phenomena, I shall give the gist of the matter below. [Cf. *Phänomenologie und Erkenntnislehre* (1913) and *Lehre von den drei Tatsachen* (1911) in *Nachlassband*, I (1933), and also *Erkenntnis und Arbeit* (1926).]

³ Hence it is quite intelligible that Münsterberg should allot to psychology the task of ultimately 'recasting' all mental phenomena, including volition, into sensations. I am at a loss to know what 'recasting' may mean in this context.

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suppose that a mental experience cannot remain identical throughout a multiplicity of acts. Can we not feel the same sorrow or love, to a greater or lesser extent at different times, or remember the same experience many times over, and thereby actually relive and reproduce the same identical feeling, for instance? Are we not given to saying, in psychology, that the same optical sensation is sometimes manifested as a visual content or constituent thereof, and sometimes (as in hysterical blindness) is not so; that it is sometimes observed or attended to and at other times overlooked? Anyone who holds it to be an essential feature of the mental that it can never persist identically throughout a multiplicity of acts, has begun by confusing the sphere of mental phenomena with that of mental *reality*; and he is also confusing the sphere of *phenomena in general*, i.e. that which is immediately given in any objective field, with the *mental* as such. This is what Wundt did, in equating the mental with what is immediately experienced and the physical with what we arrive at indirectly. But in fact there are levels of mediacy and immediacy among the objects of external and internal perception, and hence in the natural world as well as in the mental one.¹

But just as the same mental content can be present in a multiplicity of acts, so it can also be present to a number of *different* individuals. Just as we can revive, recall and grieve, more or less, over the same painful experience at different periods in our life, so we can also join with others in grieving at one and the same experience. To be sure, we can never experience the same (physically localized) sensory pleasure or pain. These states are confined to the individual in whom they occur, and can only be like one another, never identical. But two people may very well feel the same sorrow; a strictly identical, not just a similar one, even though the experience may be differently coloured in each case by differing organic sensations. Anyone who holds that mental events are only accessible to one person at a time will never be able to explain the exact meaning of phrases like: 'All ranks were fired with the same enthusiasm', 'The populace was seized with a common joy, a common grief, a common delight', and so on. Custom, language, myth, religion, the world of the tale and the saga—how can they be understood on the assumption that mental life is essentially private?

¹ O. Külpe has recently adopted a similar account of the matter in his book *Die Realisierung*. Cf. also in my essay 'Die Idole der Selbsterkenntnis' (op. cit.), the note on Edmund Husserl's essay in *Logos* (1913). Cf. also the excellent treatment of the question in Moritz Geiger's 'Fragment über den Begriff des Unbewussten und die psychische Realität' (*Jahrbuch für Philosophie und Phänomenologische Forschung*, IV, 1921).

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What is shown by the above is that these theories confuse that aspect of our own (and others) experience which is presented in inner sense with the existence and character of the mental in general. But this error would be comparable with that of wanting to define Nature as merely the sum of those parts of it which fall within the scope of human sense-perception. For the case is actually just the same as this. Even in external perception (as an independent intentional act), we grasp a given portion of its character only against the background of the whole of Nature: in *every* such act we have assurance of the existence of the whole realm of Nature, without the need of any 'inference' or 'empathic projection'. And here, too, the body and its unity of sensibility interposes between the perceiving subject, which has both the power and the right to address itself to the whole of Nature, and its actual object. It is 'outer sense', in other words, which limits the content of perception to whatever may have a bearing upon the possible activities of the body. And although such 'contents' vary from one individual to another, even when the objects are the same, we take it for granted that it is one and the same Nature which we perceive in these contents.¹

It is a crucial objection to the view that mental life is essentially private that if its premisses were correct, we ought equally to be led to the conclusion that Nature is also a private affair. 'Subjective idealism' does in fact lead to this conclusion, and it has been very properly objected to it that if its reasoning were correct we should have to deny not only the existence of matter and the external world, but also the existence of past contents of consciousness, and of other selves. The only incorrigible certainty would be the existence of the solipsist's own momentary self. Now we actually approach such a solipsism of the moment the more we confine our existence to our own body. And there is another conclusion of no less importance than this: anyone who denies our ability to perceive other selves and their experiences, must equally be prepared to deny the perceptibility of matter. Nor is it without interest to observe how in the history of philosophy the existence of a real external world has been far more frequently denied than the existence of other selves; and this though no one has denied our ability to perceive Nature, while practically everyone has disputed our powers of perceiving mental life in others. The reason for this is that *our conviction of the existence of other minds is earlier and deeper than our belief in the existence of Nature.*

¹ We are not referring here to the way in which things are presented as 'real', for this, in our opinion, has nothing to do with whether these 'fields' exist, and only arises in the shape of 'resistance' to our volitional behaviour towards the given. Cf. note on p. 236.

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(2) But let us now turn to the other 'self-evident' assumptions made by these two theories. What else, it may be asked, can I be supposed to perceive of another man apart from his 'body' and the movements he makes?

Now to begin with, it only needs the simplest of phenomenological considerations to show that at any rate there is nothing self-evident about this. For we certainly believe ourselves to be directly acquainted with another person's joy in his laughter, with his sorrow and pain in his tears, with his shame in his blushing, with his entreaty in his outstretched hands, with his love in his look of affection, with his rage in the gnashing of his teeth, with his threats in the clenching of his fist, and with the tenor of his thoughts in the sound of his words. If anyone tells me that this is not 'perception', for it cannot be so, in view of the fact that a perception is simply a 'complex of physical sensations', and that there is certainly no sensation of another person's mind nor any stimulus from such a source, I would beg him to turn aside from such questionable theories and address himself to the phenomenological facts. All he need do in the first place is to compare these examples with cases which actually *exhibit* what his theories lead him to accept *a priori* in the present instance, namely a *conclusion* amenable to proof. Thus, for example, the actions of a man with whom I have previously spoken, and whose feelings and intentions were, as I thought, plain to me, may yet compel me to the conclusion that either I have misunderstood him and deceived myself, or else that he has been lying or pretending to me. *Here* then I do actually draw conclusions about his state of mind. Again, by a similar inference from his looks to his thoughts and feelings, I may even prepare myself in advance, e.g. in dealing with someone whom I fear to be deranged or mad, or where I suspect dissimulation or an intention to deceive. I do this, in effect, wherever I find my internal and vicarious perception of his experiences unduly *checked* in any way, or where I am compelled for specific positive reasons, themselves derived (in the last resort) from perception, to postulate a *discrepancy* between inner experience and outer expression, an (involuntary or deliberate) breach of their symbolic interrelation—a relation which holds good regardless of the particular experiences or circumstances of the individual concerned.¹ It is at this point only that I begin to draw conclusions. But it should not be forgotten in this that the *material* premisses for these conclusions are based upon my elementary perceptions of the person concerned or other people; and they therefore *pre-suppose* these immediate percep-

¹ On the connection between experience and expression, cf. the remarks of Koffka, *op. cit.* He also denies that the connection is merely learnt or acquired.

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tions. Thus I do not merely see the other person's eyes, for example; I also see that 'he is looking at me' and even that 'he is looking at me as though he wished to avoid my seeing that he is looking at me'. So too do I perceive that he is only pretending to feel what he does not feel at all, that he is severing the familiar bond between his experience and its natural expression, and is substituting another expressive movement in place of the particular phenomenon implied by his experience. Hence I can tell that he is lying, for example, not merely by having proof that he must be aware that he is telling it differently, and that matters are other than he says they are; for in certain circumstances I can be *directly* aware of his lying itself, of the very act of lying, so to speak. Again, there is sense in my saying to somebody, 'That isn't really what you meant to say: you are expressing yourself badly', i.e. I grasp the *meaning* he has in mind, though here it certainly cannot be deduced from his words, since otherwise I should not be in a position to correct them by reference to the meaning already given beforehand.

It may be argued, perhaps, that although such differences occur, they do not represent a difference between perception and inference, but only the contrast between a simple, primitive or 'unconscious' form of inference and a more elaborate and conscious one. But enough of such objections, fabricated in the interests of a fallacious theory and capable of proving anything or nothing.¹

Let us now go on to consider the claim that we can have no immediate perception of anything in other people except their bodies and physical movements.

Our immediate perceptions of our fellow-men do not relate to their bodies (unless we happen to be engaged in a medical examination), nor yet to their 'selves' or 'souls'. What we perceive are *integral wholes*, whose intuitive content is not immediately resolved in terms of external or internal perception. From this stage of givenness we can then go on, in the second place, to adopt the attitude of internal or external perception. But the fact that the individual bodily unity thus immediately presented should be

¹ It is easy to point to the psychological sources of this 'theory'. It comes down to us, historically speaking, as one of a number of theories typical of the Enlightenment (the contract theory of the state, the conventional theory of language, etc.), which all conceive of the origins of the community in terms of an 'artificial society' in which distrust has become a permanent attitude. Cf. 'Das Ressentiment im Aufbau der Moralen', op. cit.

It may be noted that we often make inferences with regard to our own experiences also; as when we say: 'What sort of man can I be to have done that?', or when we seek to account for a mood of our own which is not intelligible in terms of our present circumstances.

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associated, in general, with a possible object accessible both to internal and external perception, is founded upon the *intrinsic* connection between these intuitive contents, a connection which also underlies my own perception of myself. It is not acquired through observation and induction from my own case. Such a connection holds good for the nature of all living organisms generally.¹

The appearances presented by this individual bodily unity are originally no less inconclusive, as regards their psychophysical character, than the unity itself. They may be capable of further analysis, e.g. into unities of pure colour, shape and outline, or unities of change, movement and variation. But every 'expressive unity' at this level of appearance remains a unity belonging to the whole of this living organism as an individual *whole*. At this level, such an appearance has *no* sort of function as a symbol, either for the bodily unity (or its parts) as presented in external perception, or for the unity of the individual self and its experience (or its parts) as allocated to internal perception. Moreover, the appearances at this level are incorporated into *combinations and structures of quite a different kind*, according to whether they take on the symbolic function, in the act of external perception, of symbolizing the individual's body (and its reactions to other bodies in the environment), or whether they serve, in the act of internal perception, to symbolize the individual's self (and its reactions to other selves in the environment). Thus it is only within these different fields of perception—and depending on which of them is operative, that *one* combination of the same stimuli presents an appearance in which we perceive the other person's *body* (an appearance manifestly due to external impressions), whereas another combination of the same stimuli yields an appearance in which we perceive that person's *self* (an appearance manifestly expressive of his inner life). Hence it is intrinsically impossible ever to resolve the unity of an expressive phenomenon (such as a smile, or a menacing, kindly or affectionate look), into a sum of appearances, however large, such that its members could equally

¹ This also applies to the lower organisms. It is possible for a physiologist to give a completely 'mechanistic' explanation of the wriggings of a severed worm, and to smile (like Jacques Loeb) at the notion that it is 'wriggling with pain' (since the headless portions also wriggle). But of course it is quite absurd to argue, from the possibility of this mechanico-causal explanation, that the movement is not also expressive of pain (by alleging that the worm cannot feel pain without its head). It would be as absurd as to argue that a man's blushing cannot be an expression of shame, since it can be explained mechanically (as indeed it can) as a rush of blood to the cheeks. For what bearing does a mechanico-causal explanation have upon symbolic functions, such as the phenomena of expression?

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well comprise a unity of appearance in which we might perceive the body, or a unitary impression from the physical environment. If I adopt the approach of external perception, and rely upon the unities of appearance presented therein, they will enable me to form an impression of any part of the individual's body, however small; but in any combination of such unities I shall never come upon the unity of a smile, an entreaty, a threatening gesture and so on. Again, the shade of red which visibly covers the physical surface of a man's cheek can never present the unity of a blush, whose redness appears, as it were, as the outcome of the shame which I sense him to feel. If the cheek is red, merely, the same immediate appearance of redness might equally well betray overheating, anger or debauchery, or be due to the light from a red lamp.

Perhaps this may give us a rather better understanding of the supposedly 'self-evident fact' that we can only perceive the bodies of other people. If we begin by treating colours, sounds, shapes, etc., as 'sensations', when they are really *qualities* appearing in conjunction with sensation: if again, we treat the perception based upon (though not composed of) such qualitative complexes, as a complex of sensations, though sensation plays no part in it; and if we then forget that on this (doubly erroneous) view of perception it is *no more possible* to perceive the body than it is to perceive the self, and still consider it feasible on these premisses to do so, then we do indeed reach the remarkable conclusion that we can perceive the bodies of other people but not their selves. This 'result' is achieved by coupling a set of (partially) false factual premisses with a fallacy of four terms.

We need not concern ourselves, in *this* context, with the *theory* of perception adopted in any given case. If anyone supposes the content of perception to be a complex of sensations and their derivatives, such as the evoked memory-traces of previous sensations, he need not fancy himself able to 'perceive' the body of another person. If anyone supposes that perception always implies a judgement, he should recognize that (strangely enough) it is also possible to make an 'immediate' judgement to the effect that somebody is ashamed. If it be said that perception involves an inference (albeit an 'unconscious' one), it should be admitted that such unconscious 'inferences' also figure in the perception of other minds.¹ The fact that my body must be affected by physical and

¹ Sensualism can be extremely naïve. Hume marvels at the fact that men should have hated and fought one another so much, simply because they were yellow or black or white. That is his conception of racial conflict and hatred! But we venture to suppose that the Americans do not hate the negroes because they are black—there being no evidence, as yet, that they also dislike the blackness of clothes or materials; they scent the negro under the blackness of his skin. (Cf. Hume's *History of England*.)

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chemical stimuli emanating from another body, does not mean that I have to be aware of that body, or that I must first be conscious of some of the sensory appearances, sounds, colours, smells, etc., corresponding to these stimuli, before I can recognize an expression of friendliness, and so on.

The primary awareness, in ourselves, in animals and in primitives, invariably consists of *patterns of wholeness*; sensory appearances are only given in so far as they function as the basis of these patterns, or can take on the further office of signifying or representing such wholes.